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P r e f a c e
This dissertation consists o f four chapters that provide detailed information about 
the current use (CU) property taxation program and the determinants o f program 
effectiveness. An introduction to the CU program and the approach o f property 
assessment is given in the first chapter. This explores the CU assessment formula in 
general and reviews CU assessment o f agricultural land in New Hampshire, giving an 
explanation o f why the CU assessment o f agricultural land in New Hampshire needs to be 
revised.
The second chapter, “Current Use Property Taxation in Conserving New 
Hampshire Land: An Empirical Investigation Using Multiple Imputations,” is centered on 
the CU program in New Hampshire. Since the inception o f the CU program in 1974, the 
program has been widely known and considered the corner stone in conserving 
undeveloped land from being developed for urbanized uses, such as commercial or 
residential development. About fifty percent o f total land in the state is enrolled in the 
program. The purpose o f the second chapter is to examine the factors that lead 
landowners to enroll land in the program. Town level data for the years 1999-2011 from 
231 towns is used in the analysis. The factors addressed in the chapter cover some CU 
program related features and the influence of two central business districts, Boston in 
Massachusetts and Manchester in New Hampshire, in determining enrollment or 
withdrawal from the program. The chapter also focuses on comparing missing data 
treatment techniques that exist in the econometric literature. The missing data treatments 
considered are simple deletion, mean substitution and multiple imputations. The results
suggest possible tax savings from the program as the major determinant in enrolling land 
in the CU program.
The third chapter, “Determinants o f Current-Use Property Tax Programs in the 
U.S.,” explores the determinants in implementing a CU program and imposing different 
CU withdrawal penalties in the U.S. All states, except Michigan, have implemented some 
sort of a CU assessment program during the years between 1956 and 1997. Owing to the 
period o f program implementation, I chose to study the years between 1949-1997 to 
understand the factors that led to program implementation and specific distribution o f 
withdrawal penalties. The techniques used in the third chapter are duration analysis, 
competing-risk regressions and random effect multinomial logit analysis. The results 
confirm that most CU programs are implemented due to unprecedented growth in urban 
land in states that aim to protect agricultural land. According to the results, CU program 
withdrawal penalties are less common in states that are highly dependent on agriculture.
The fourth chapter, “Evaluation o f Current-Use Property Tax Programs 
Effectiveness,” studies the CU programs’ effectiveness in discouraging conversion o f 
undeveloped land to more urbanized uses. Previous research, as well as findings from the 
previous two chapters, suggests that receiving a considerable property tax relief has been 
one of the major determinants o f enrolling land in the CU program. However, some of 
the features o f the CU program may discourage land development. The features 
emphasized in this chapter are CU withdrawal penalties and the presence of restrictive 
agreements on land development. A state level study and a case study from New 
Hampshire are presented in the fourth chapter. Finding detailed information on property 
tax rates and CU withdrawal penalties for all the states was a challenging task in the
analysis. Therefore, using available information on property taxes, capitalization rates 
and land assessment values; a simulated database consisting o f state level CU withdrawal 
penalties was developed as part o f the work done in the chapter. For the case study, new 
residential permits issued in a given year in New Hampshire are used as a proxy measure 
for residential land development rates. Results obtained using random effect panel 
analysis of the state level study do not support the hypothesis that CU withdrawal 
penalties result in. slower development o f land across states. However, the percentage of 
land enrolled in the CU program in New Hampshire suggests that an increase in land 
enrollment in the state CU program is linked to lower residential land development.
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A b s t r a c t
E s s a y s  o n  C u r r e n t  U s e  P r o p e r t y  T a x a t i o n  
by
Darshana Udayanganie 
University of New Hampshire, September 2013
Conservation of agricultural and forestry land has taken on a new urgency as 
development patterns have exploded over the past few decades, due to demand for 
residential, industrial and commercial land uses in the U.S. As a result, numerous land 
conservation programs have been implemented over the years. Current Use Property 
Taxation is one of the land conservation programs that was initiated in the 1960s, 
introducing some property tax relief for landowners who wished to keep undeveloped 
productive land in current use without developing it for more urbanized uses.
The substantial property tax relief landowners receive by enrolling land in the 
Current Use program was believed to be the main determinant in avoiding property tax 
induced land development. However, the forgone property tax revenue was a concern for 
state and local governments. In order to recapture forgone tax revenues and also to 
discourage enrollment o f land for short-term property tax gains, withdrawal penalties and 
restrictions on land development were introduced. Current Use program features are not 
consistent across states and the reasons for interstate differences are not clear.
This dissertation explores the factors that lead to such variations across states and 
whether such variations in fact lead to differences in land development. One chapter
xii
focuses on detailing the factors that lead New Hampshire landowners to enroll land in the 
program, while another chapter explores the factors that determined differences in 
program features across states. The last chapter explores whether the Current Use 
program is effective in slowing the land development in the U.S. by considering a town- 
level case study from New Hampshire and also a state level analysis.
C h a p t e r  1
1 In t r o d u c t io n  
1.1 Introduction
Conversion o f agricultural and forestland or other open space land for residential and 
commercial development has been a matter o f great concern over the past few decades. 
Conservation of open space land not only delays haphazard development, but also promises 
benefits such as regional food supply and environmental pollution control. For many people, 
natural resources are an important part o f their lives. Therefore, preservation o f natural areas 
generally benefits the economic wellbeing of current and future residents. Development 
pressures result in an appreciation o f land value. Although this value increment is beneficial 
for the landowner, it may not be helpful for their ability to pay increasing property taxes, 
especially if a landowner relies on income from the land in order to cover property tax bills. 
Property taxes based on the market value o f open space in the urban fringe areas are more 
likely to be higher than the land's current potential income (Malme, 1993). Therefore, 
property taxes become a burden for landowners at the urban fringe. Hence, landowners may 
be enticed to sell a portion or all o f  the land when property taxes become a burden. 
Numerous property tax relief programs have been introduced (Stienbarger, 2004) over the 
years to provide an economic incentive for the owners to retain their lands in rural uses 
without selling for more urbanized uses.
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The Current Use (CU) Property Taxation program is one of the preferential property 
taxation systems adopted in the U.S. to slow down the pace of tax-induced and market- 
induced development. The CU program focuses on the land's income potential in its 
traditional uses, rather than on the fluctuating real estate market value o f undeveloped land in 
property tax calculations. Lands that qualify for the CU program include undeveloped 
farmland, forestland, certified tree farms, wetlands and even other sites unsuitable for 
agriculture. CU programs became a trend in states in the 1970s even though some states had 
adopted similar programs before 1970. Such programs have been widely accepted across the 
country over the past two decades. A property taxation system based on the current use of 
undeveloped land is an effective way to provide a shield against higher property taxes. 
Therefore, the CU Taxation program makes ownership o f lands less burdensome for the 
urban fringe landowners (England, 2011).
The primary focus o f this dissertation is to discuss CU program characteristics, its 
success factors, reasons for different program features and its effectiveness in land 
conservation in the U.S. However, empirical studies that support or confirm those theoretical 
suggestions are lacking. This dissertation contributes to the CU literature with three detailed 
empirical studies that unfolds in chapters 2 to 4. For the empirical studies, I' consider CU 
program features at state level and in New Hampshire. Chapter 2 focuses on town level data 
in New Hampshire in predicting specific features that could attract landowners to enroll land 
in the program. Chapter 3 focuses on predicting specific determinants that lead to 
implementation o f CU programs and imposition o f withdrawal penalties in states at different 
years, starting from the 1950s to the end o f  the 1990s. Chapter 4 focuses on evaluating CU 
program features such as withdrawal penalties and restrictive agreements’ effectiveness in
2
conserving land in the U.S. Most o f the CU programs are implemented at the local 
government level and therefore collection of data on CU programs at the state level was 
difficult. Consequently, a simulated dataset was developed for analyses done in Chapter 4 
and the developed database is another contribution to the CU literature.
Unprecedented growth in conversion o f land led to the initiation of many conservation 
programs that targeted protection o f rural land and rural characteristics. Before I discuss the 
CU program, providing some background knowledge about alternative land conservation 
programs is important. As a result, the rest o f this chapter is devoted to providing some 
information on alternative land conservation programs in the U.S., which follows with a 
detailed background of CU program characteristics. The most notable and highly discussed 
feature of CU programs is the use value assessment o f lands enrolled in the CU program. 
Then, a theoretical explanation o f the CU value assessment formula is presented in this 
chapter. The last section of the chapter reviews the existing CU assessment for agricultural 
land in New Hampshire.
1.2 Alternative Land Policies in Conserving Land
Potential benefits of preserving land are not only gained by the landowners living 
near conserved land, but also by the public living in the region too. Open space preservation 
or slowing o f conversion o f farm and forest land into residential and commercial purposes 
led to many legislations and programs. The programs or legislations introduced by 
government entities and private organizations in the past include exclusive agricultural 
zoning, purchase and transfer o f development rights, conservation easements, tax-credit 
programs and public land etc.
The selection of a conservation program by a landowner depends on a couple o f 
criteria. As shown in table 1.1, landowners can decide whether they want to maintain the 
ownership o f the land or not and whether they need any monetary compensation for 
conservation etc. Hence, the “bundle o f rights” that comes with the ownership o f the land, 
may be exchanged or given-up upon conservation. The “bundle o f rights” may include the 
right to occupy, lease, use, sell and develop the land at the owner’s discretion. However, the 
important question is “why do landowners decide to conserve land?” The economic rewards 
the landowners receive are believed to be the primary incentives for conservation. Economic 
rewards may be received in terms o f tax relief on income, property or estate taxes in return 
for conveying their real property rights.
With several alterative programs to land conservation, it is important that a landowner 
considers a program that fits his/her land conservation motivation. This section summarizes 
some o f the land conservation programs and covers how those programs meet conservation 
efforts and the incentives landowners would receive for conservation.
Purchase of Development Rights IPDRl: The rights to develop a land for residential 
or commercial purposes come with the ownership o f land. The purchase o f development 
rights involves the sale o f rights to develop the land, while all other rights remain with the 
landowner. Once an offer to purchase development rights is made by a land trust or an 
agency linked to .the local government, the selling o f development rights by a landowner is a 
completely voluntary process. When an agreement is made between the landowner and the 
land trust or the local government’s agency, a permanent deed restriction is placed on the 
property that restricts development, which ensures the land remains an agricultural, forestry
or open space land in perpetuity. The owner could sell the land, lease the land or pass it to 
heirs with the deed restriction. According to Kline and Wichlens (1994), 18 states have 
active PDR programs. Once the land’s development rights are sold, the value of the land 
basically comes down to the agricultural land value. This gives a substantial tax relief on 
inheritance tax liability (Kline & Wichlens, 1994).
Transfer o f Development Rights: Transfer o f development rights (TDR) is another 
option available to protect agricultural lands. With TDR, the rights to develop a.land are 
transferred from one area to another. When the development rights are transferred, 
development densities (“building bonus”) allowed in the areas being developed increase 
(Stinson, 1996). For example, TDR in an area which requires at least 1/4 acre per unit of 
development will increase the development densities by requiring only 1/6 acre per unit if  
“building bonuses” are received in return to TDR. The increase in density is an incentive for 
developers in a growth zone, known as a “receiving area,” to buy development rights from a 
preservation area, known as a “sending area” (see figure 1.1). Although TDR programs’ 
objectives resemble those o f PDR, TDR needs to occur in a more controlled setting to 
determine “sending areas” and “receiving areas.” With TDR, development rights can be 
directly transferred to a developer or to a TDR bank established by a local government.
Conservation Easements: A conservation easement is a restriction placed on a land 
parcel to protect natural or man-made resources, and is considered to be one o f the primary 
tools o f land conservation today (Bowers & Daniels, 1997; Gutanski, 2000; Lindstrom, 
2008). Conservation easements allow continued use o f land for agriculture, forestry, ranching
etc., while protecting the open space and natural value o f the land. Using easements, private 
landowners decide to protect land by conveying some or most o f their rights to use the land 
to a nonprofit organization, a government agency or a land trust that is responsible for 
ensuring that the requirements o f easements are fulfilled. This legally binding contract may 
be for a specified time period or in perpetuity. The easement holder is responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing restrictions on the property as specified in the covenant (Andrus, 
1982; Lindstrom, 2008). For example, if an agricultural land is specified as a conservation 
easement, then the easement holder needs to ensure that the agricultural land will remain 
conducive to agriculture in the future. As with other easements, agricultural easements limit 
or may prohibit development o f the land for residential or commercial purposes. However, an 
easement agreement does not absolve the property owner from traditional responsibilities, 
such as property taxes, upkeep and maintenance. As discussed before, monetary benefits a 
landowner receives offer motivation for the owner to declare a land as an easement. Federal 
income tax and/or property tax benefits a landowner receives for easements are state and 
locally determined, and are substantial.
The federal tax incentives that encourage the donation o f a conservation easement 
include the following: an income tax deduction based on the easement’s appraisal value and 
exclusion o f the easement’s value from the property for estate tax purposes; and an additional 
estate tax exclusion o f up to 40 percent o f the value o f the land included in the easement. 
Sometimes people refer to easements as PDR, although conservation easements are not 
actually equivalent to PDR. Conservation easements consider land conservation goals 
without regulation, without adversity and often even without government involvement.
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Conservation easements are valuable as a land protection tool that complements regulation, 
land acquisition and tax policies to ensure optimum public benefits (Pidot, 2005).
Agricultural Zoning: Agricultural zoning, which began in the 1920s, aims to protect 
viability o f agriculture in a region, in order to protect communities that are concerned about 
economic viability o f agricultural activities. Local governments enact agricultural zoning 
through collaborative agreements with farmers, businesses, residents, developers or anyone 
who may be affected by zoning ordinance. Agricultural zoning governs regulations to 
prevent farmland from being converted to nonfarm uses and also to protect agricultural land 
from nonfarm intrusion. Establishing agricultural zoning makes agricultural land affordable 
for new owners and makes agricultural production profitable. Agricultural zoning also is 
helpful in preserving the rural character o f a community, which prevents communities from 
constant increases in property taxes due to rises in land value and increases in demand for 
public services. With agricultural zoning, the density o f  residential development is controlled 
by requiring a minimum size o f agricultural land in order to build a non-agricultural related 
dwelling. The minimum size o f a lot depends on the intensity o f  the agricultural activity. For 
example, a farm with livestock and cropping operations may require 160 acres to get 
permission to build a nonagricultural dwelling, whereas, a farm allocated for horticultural 
activities may require a minimum o f 25 acres. With some zoning, clustered residential 
development is allowed.
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1.3 Current Use Property Taxation Program Features
The CU program that initiated in Maryland in 1956, introduced very important 
property tax reforms at state and local levels over the past few decades. Although the primary 
objective o f the program is to provide property tax relief to agricultural and forestry 
landowners (in some states even open space land), some o f the CU program features are in 
place to discourage land development as well. Variations in program features make the 
program differ across states in the areas o f enrollment procedure, enrollment eligibility, use 
value assessment procedures, presence o f restrictive agreements on development and the 
imposition o f CU withdrawal penalties. This section summarizes variations o f the above 
program features across states, which is followed by a theoretical description on how CU 
assessments are done. The impact of different features o f the program on land conservation 
and land conversion is evaluated in later chapters.
In some states CU program enrollment is automatic. In other states where the 
enrollment is voluntary, landowners are still required to file an application. In either case, 
enrolled lands are assessed not at the market value, but at their current use value for tax 
purposes. In the states with automatic enrollment, landowners qualify for the tax benefit if 
the land qualifies for CU assessment. In contrast, in the states with voluntary enrollment, 
landowners qualify for the tax benefit at their discretion, which requires submission of an 
application to qualify for the tax benefit. To qualify for the tax benefit, applications may be 
submitted each year or just once as long as the use o f  the land is unchanged. There are 13 
states with automatic enrollment, while 36 states operate with voluntary enrollment. In 
chapters 3 and 4, I evaluate the reasons for and outcomes o f such differences in program 
enrollment across states.
Eligibilities to receive tax benefits also differ across states and vary in terms o f the 
required minimum size o f a parcel, a history o f eligible use or a minimum cash income from 
specified rural use (England, 2011). For example, in New Hampshire for a land to qualify for 
the tax benefit, whether it be a farm, forest, an unproductive land or any combination o f 
above lands, it has to be at least ten acres. If the land is a wetland, then the size o f  the land 
has to be less than ten acres. Otherwise, any size o f agricultural or horticultural land 
qualifies, if  the annual gross income from crop sales totals at least $2,500 per year. In 
contrast, Arizona does not have any minimum requirement for land size or a minimum cash 
income for a land to qualify for the benefit.
Another program feature that makes CU programs vary across states is the presence 
of restrictive agreements on development. If  state CU programs include a restrictive 
agreement, landowners are required to refrain from land development for a certain number o f 
years. For example, in California and Washington CU program landowners are refrained for 
ten years from developing the enrolled land. I f  a land is withdrawn before the maturity period 
of the restrictive agreement, penalties are imposed. Chapter 3 gives more details on 
restrictive agreements o f states and chapter 4 evaluates whether these restrictive agreements 
lead to differences in land development compared to the states with no restrictive 
agreements.
Penalties for CU withdrawal, which include a payment fee for landowners who 
withdraw land from the program, result in differences in CU programs across states. Based 
on withdrawal penalties, CU programs can fall into one of two categories: preferential 
property taxation or deferred CU taxation. With preferential taxation, a CU withdrawal 
penalty is not imposed, and the landowners enjoy lower property taxes as long as lands are
enrolled in the program. In contrast, in deferred taxation states, landowners are required to 
pay a penalty upon withdrawal from the program. The penalties can be based on the market 
value o f land at the time of sale (market value penalty) or could be dependent on the amount 
of property tax savings landowners received (roll-back penalty) while enrolled in the 
program. Market value penalties range between 10-20% o f the land’s sale value, whereas the 
penalties based on property tax savings depend on tax savings from the past 3-10 years. The 
number of years considered in roll-back penalty varies from state to state. Chapters 3 and 4 
provide further details on CU withdrawal penalties and evaluate possible influences of 
withdrawal penalties on land development.
1.4 Theoretical Background in Assessing Agricultural Current Use Land
Assessment o f land for property tax purposes plays the major role in deriving tax 
relief for CU landowners. The transparency and accuracy in value assessment m aybe the 
main features attracting more landowners to enroll their land, and keeping those parcels 
enrolled in the program for a longer period of time or in perpetuity. Hence, accurate 
calculation of the income potential o f  CU land is important in most o f  the states. In contrast, 
some other states specify a certain percentage o f the market value as the CU value. Basic 
challenges in use value assessment arise in determining the net income stream generated by 
agricultural land, and the appropriate capitalization rate to convert that net revenue stream to 
use value. The capitalization rate, which varies considerably across states, is the ratio 
between the projected net operating income produced by an asset and its current market value 
(Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2010). Most o f the states rely on the Farm Credit
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Services (FCS) or Federal Land Bank (FLB) rate o f interest as a principal component o f the 
capitalization rate (Kansas Department of Revenue, 2000).
The price o f a developed land parcel is comprised o f several components (Anderson,
2011). The components are capitalized net income o f land, value o f capital improvement, 
value o f accessibility and value o f expected future rent increase. According to Anderson
(2011) and Helsley (1989), the location o f land has no influence on the first two components.
P d™l°'*d(t,z) = -  + C + ( - ) ( t ) ( z ( t ) - z ] H h r ■ (1.1)
r r_L________ / t r Jt________________^
Capitalized ° f  Valueof accessibility Value o f  expected
value o f  capital future rent increase
annual improvement
agricultural (?o s' ° f
rent development)
Where
A : Agricultural land rent
r : Discount rate
c :Value o f  capital improvement
T .Cost o f  commuting a unit o f  distance
L : Mean lot size
z : Boundary o f  urban area
Ru : Rent on the agricultural land
t .Time o f  development
The value o f  agricultural land can be deduced from the above formula as follows:
P°gric{ t , z )=  -  + ( - ) / ” * > ,  z )e - r^ ' \ d t  (1.2)
r  x r Jt________________ #
Capitalized Value o f  expected





To simplify the above formula, i.e. if the value o f expected future rents to agricultural land is
Aignored, the rent o f an agricultural land would be only — . In current use property taxations,
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land values are assessed with the assumption that the land would remain in the current 
agricultural (or forestry) use in perpetuity. Therefore, the value o f expected future rent 
increases are ignored in CU property tax calculations and the assessed value o f  agricultural 
land can be written as follows:
oo
V(/) = j  A(u)e-r(u-°du (1.3) 
o
In the presence o f property taxes, income potential o f land as shown in (1.3) will be further 
discounted with the rate of property taxes. By incorporating property tax rates, equation 1.3 
can further simplify to equation 1.4:
oo
V(t) = j  A(u)e-(r+TXu~0du (1.4) 
o
where V(t) is the value of property at time t, assuming net revenue stream is generated by the 
highest and best use o f land. If land is enrolled in the CU program, the above stream of 
income is considered at perpetuity. Hence, the above 1.4 formula can be simplified as:
oo
Vcc/= f  A(u)e~(r+T)vdu (1.5)
0
A
where Vcu is approximated (Anderson, 2011). as: -------------  (1.6)
(r + r)
Therefore, the discount rate applicable in assessing income potential o f land enrolled 
in the CU program should consider both interest and property tax rates. See table 1.2 for
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details on how some states have determined the discount rate to assess properties enrolled in 
the CU program. As shown, federal land bank (FLB) loan rates and farm credit service (FCS) 
interest rates have been largely used in determining discount rates. However, it should be 
noted that not all states use FCS or FLB interest rates to determine discount rates. A detailed 
description o f discount rate calculation is given in the next sub-section on CU valuation 
procedure in practice.
Not all states follow the suggested CU assessment formula in equation 1.6. I provide 
an example from Virginia’s CU assessment procedure to understand the CU assessment 
components as suggested in equation 1.6 and CU literature. The components o f assessment 
reviewed in this section include net farm income, interest rate (discount rate), property tax, 
risk and soil productivity, as described by Bruce & Groover (2010); assessments done are
r
shown in table 1.3. The focus of this section is to review CU assessment procedure in New 
Hampshire with respect to equation 1.6. In the sections to follow, I describe how CU 
assessments are done, and suggest avenues to improve and revise agricultural assessments in 
New Hampshire.
Net Farm Income; In CU valuation o f agricultural land, the determination o f income 
from land is important. In equation 1.6, farming income is captured by A. When considering 
farming incomes, it is recommended to use a moving average o f  three to five years to 
calculate the average farm income per year. Averaging o f farming income for different 
agricultural activities will help account for any income fluctuations due to weather or any 
disturbances due to market outcomes. According to the cooperative extension at the 
University o f  New Hampshire (UNH), agricultural use value assessments for the years 2006-
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2011 are calculated based on the annual net returns to New Hampshire farmland for hay, com 
and corn silage. Farmer surveys conducted in the spring o f 2006 have been the source for 
farm budgets’ information, and National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) agricultural 
price reports have been used to adjust agricultural prices for the years that follow the base 
year.
In addition to the calculation of net farm income in CU assessment, consideration of 
the discount rate is important (equation 1.6). The following section provides a discussion on 
criteria used by most states to determine the discount rate component in CU assessment.
Interest Rate Component (Discount Rate!: In most states, the interest rate component 
of the capitalization rate is derived using average annual effective interest rates on new loans 
under the FCS. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Bulletin (Department o f the 
Treasury, 1996-2011), these interest rates have been used by other states in computing 
special use value o f farm properties. Figure 1.2 shows average FCS rates from 1996-2011 for' 
all FCS branches, and figure 1.3 shows actual FCS rates, 3-year averages and 5-year 
averages of FCS rates for CoBank, the FCS branch which serves farm credit services to 
Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington (Spokane & Springfield 
branches).
As shown in table 1.2, in most of the states, FCS rates used in CU assessment are the 
averages o f FCS rates over a couple o f years. Hence, annual or short-term fluctuations are 
absorbed in discount rate calculations. According to farmland CU assessment in New
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Hampshire, the discount rate used during the years 2007-2011 (UNH, cooperative extension,
2012) has been 4% and has not been based on FCS or FLB rates. As shown in figure 1.3, 
FCS rates have declined considerably since 2001, and the lowest FCS rates are reported in 
2006 in almost all the FCS branches. Since 2006, FCS rates have been on a slow rise. Hence, 
the discount rates used in CU assessment in New Hampshire need to be adjusted to account 
for such fluctuations.
Property Tax Rate Component: In addition to the FCS component, the property tax 
rate also needs to be considered in discount rate calculation (equation 1.6). Figure 1.4 shows 
New Hampshire’s county level full value tax rates (FVTR) from 1999-2011. As shown, the 
Carroll county FVTRs have been consistently lower by $15-20 than all other counties. As 
discussed before, the interest rate component may equal the 3-year or 5-year averages o f FCS 
rates. Similarly, the property tax rate component may also equal 3-year or 5-year averages 
obtained from the New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration (NHDRA) 
equalization reports from 1999-2011. It is not clear whether CU assessment in New 
Hampshire uses annual averages o f property tax rates or the property tax rate from each year. 
Using 3-year or 5-year averages o f FVTRs would be more pertinent in accounting for short­
term fluctuations o f FVTRs.
Risk Component: The risks associated with farming may or may not impact areas 
uniformly (Bruce & Groover, 2010). Therefore, in calculating use values, accounting for 
risks is important. The risks that are associated with input costs, crop yields and prices are
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adequately accounted for in calculating net return to farming. Consequently, risks associated 
with the above are not considered in use value calculation in New Hampshire. Other risks 
that need to be accounted for are droughts and floods. In most states, droughts are not 
considered a risk component that could lead to variations in use values across jurisdictions. 
The reason for lack o f consideration is, in most cases, drought affects the state’s agriculture 
uniformly; therefore, drought impact is uniformly distributed across state. Similarly, droughts 
need not be considered in use value calculation in New Hampshire due to relatively 
homogenous climate zones across jurisdictions, owing to the size o f the state. However, flood 
risks need to be accounted for in use value calculation, because flood risks are mostly related 
to land’s location, geography etc. Therefore, flood risks borne by specific jurisdictions in the 
state need to be accounted for. When considering New Hampshire, riverine flooding is the 
most common disaster in New Hampshire (New. Hampshire Department of Emergency 
Planning, 2012). According to the Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan in 2010, significant 
riverine flooding impacts some areas o f  the state in fewer than ten-year intervals. Therefore 
in use value calculation, the capitalization rate needs to be increased (Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, 2010) for the areas that are prone to flooding. In Virginia, the 
risk adjustment is 5%.
National flood insurance (NFIns) statistics from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency is the data source that can be used to determine the jurisdictions with high 
occurrences of flooding. NFIns information can be used to adjust capitalization rates for 
flood risks. According to NFIns statistics, approximately 3,600 flood insurance claims have 
been reported in New Hampshire since 1978, with paid claims totaling about $46,800,000 
(see table 1.4). Twenty-six jurisdictions have been identified as high flood insurance claim
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areas (New Hampshire Department of Emergency Planning, 2012), based on the number of 
claims made. Using flood risk statistics in use value calculation would yield more accuarte 
assessment for agricultural land.
In addition to the above review on net farm income, discount rates and risk components 
in relation to CU assessment in New Hampshire, productivity o f soil is also considered in CU 
assessment. In contrast to the land productivity index used in Virginia (see table 1.3), New 
Hampshire uses the soil productivity index. The following section describes how the soil 
productivity index is incorporated into the assessment o f CU land in New Hampshire.
Soil Productivity Component (Soil Productivity Index): The soil productivity index 
(SPI) rating system, developed by USDA soil conservation service (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1993), has been used in CU assessment in New Hampshire. SPI 
is a numerical rating of soil’s relative suitability for growing corn silage and grass legume 
hay, the crops selected by agricultural specialists as being the two most representative crops 
grown in New Hampshire. Therefore, SPI is calculated based on the soil’s suitability for 
growing corn silage and grass legume hay. SPI considers indexes o f soil production (P), cost 
o f corrective measures (CM) and cost o f continuing limitations (CL), and SPI can be. written 
as follows:
SPI = P -  (CM+CL), where P is the index o f production or yield capability, CM is the index
that accounts for costs in corrective measures to overcome soil limitations and CL is the
index o f costs resulting from continued limitations. Final SPI is an average o f SPIs o f com
silage and grass legume hay. In SPI, ranking ranges from 0-100, where 100 is assigned to the
best agricultural soil and an SPI o f 0 is assigned to the worst agricultural soil (United States
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Department of Agriculture, 1993). The evaluation factors used in potential ratings are slope, 
available water holding capacity in the upper 40 inches, depth to bed rock, rock fragments in 
the surface layer, water table level, soil permeability and mean annual soil temperature. In 
New Hampshire, landowners are required to provide information on SPI if assessments are 
needs to be adjusted based on SPI (New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration 
Current Use Criteria Booklet, 2012). Worksheets on assessing SPI are available to 
landowners to determine SPI (United States Department of Agriculture, 1993). According to 
USDA Soil Conservation Service, prime farmland in New Hampshire has an SPI range 
between 68-100. A sample o f SPI calculation as described by the soil conservation service is 
provided in the table 1.5.
The above section provided a discussion on components used in assessing CU value of 
land using Virginia’s assessment as an example that follows Anderson’s '(2011) theoretical 
model as shown in equation 1.6. I considered equation 1.6 when identifying the components 
that need to be revised in assessing agricultural land in New Hampshire. The following 
section provides a discussion on the history o f CU assessment ranges in New Hampshire’s 
agricultural and forestry land and the reasons why agricultural land assessment ranges need 
to be revised in the near future.
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1.5 Current Use Assessment of Agricultural and Forestry Land in New
Hampshire
Table 1.6 shows assessment ranges per acre for agricultural land in New Hampshire. As 
shown, assessment range for farmland has been consistently $25-425 per acre since 1995. 
This suggests the need for revising agricultural assessment ranges in New Hampshire. 
Constant assessment ranges can lead to a couple o f drawbacks. Tax assessments need to be 
adjusted for inflation, changes in productivity o f  land, etc. Productivity may not be consistent 
for an extended time, which affects income potential o f land. Therefore, landowners may be 
paying more property taxes than they are supposed to over the years. Also, towns may be 
losing some potential tax revenue. The methodology outlined in section 1.4 as suggested in 
equation 1.6 would be ideal in revising agricultural land assessment in New Hampshire. As 
discussed, the New Hampshire CU assessment formula needs to be revised by incorporating 
annual averages of FCS rates and property tax rates, and adjusting assessments with 
consideration to risk factors.
According to CU booklets issued by the New Hampshire’s Department o f Revenue 
Administration, forestland assessment ranges have been updated at least in four-year 
intervals. In New Hampshire, enrolled forestlands are assessed based on whether the 
landowner offers a forest management plan (with documented stewardship) or not. As shown 
in table 1.6, forestland enrolled with documented stewardship offers the additional incentive 
of further reduced assessment ranges. Both ownership categories are divided into three 
classifications (four prior to 1999). The classifications are white pine, hardwood (red oak, 
sugar maple, yellow birch, white birch, and other less common types o f hardwood) and all 
other, which includes Christmas tree farms. The assessment ranges reflect market values o f
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the timber or the product, the land’s capacity to produce wood and other factors that directly 
affect harvesting o f timber or products. These other factors may include the presence or 
absence o f steep slopes, ravines, boulders, wetlands or other physical characteristics that 
influence the costs o f harvesting the product or timber. The location o f the forestland 
(whether it is located on a paved state road etc.) is another factor.
1.6 Conclusions and Suggestions
This chapter provides a brief introduction about land conservation programs in the 
U.S., highlights the importance o f the program in conserving land and discusses a theoretical 
background on how CU assessments are done. The CU program is one o f the leading land 
conservation programs in New Hampshire. The percentage o f agricultural land in the 
program is about 30% of the total land enrolled in the program. Therefore, accurate 
assessment of agricultural land is important for landowners as well as for local governments. 
According to CU official reports, agricultural assessment values have been consistent for 
almost fifteen years. This clearly shows the need to revise agricultural assessment values in 
New Hampshire’s CU program.
Following the theoretical model developed by Anderson (2011), an accurate prediction 
o f discount rate is important for an accurate calculation o f income potential o f land for CU 
calculation. According to CU officials in New Hampshire, this rate has been constant at 4% 
over the past few years. Therefore, this chapter provides some suggestions for revising the 
methods on calculating discount rates to include in CU assessment in New Hampshire. 
Incorporating a multiyear average o f  Springfield FCS rates, property tax rates and
20
adjustments for flood risks would lead to accurate calculation o f discount rates to be used in 
New Hampshire’s CU assessments.
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Table 1.1: Finding a Path to Conserve Land
Do you wish to retain ownership of the land?
Yes No
Do you wish to protect the land permanently? Is monetary compensation needed?
If Yes If Yes....
Conservation restriction Sale at fair market value1
Donate to a charitable remainder trust2IfNo....
Deed covenants and restriction
License or lease to conservation organization
Management agreement
Open space tax programs
If N o -
Lifetime donation of land
■
Do you wish to limit the future use of the 
property when you convey title?
If Yes—
Conservation restriction 
Deed covenants and restrictions
IfNo...
“Free and clear” donation
Bargain sale3
Sale at fair market value
Source: Ward, 2001
1 Selling land to a conservation organization
2 An independently managed account that can provide immediate income tax deductions or return an annual 
income to the owner for a fixed number o f  years or for life
3 A sale to a charitable organization or governmental agency at less than fair market value
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Table 1.2: Capitalization Rate Determination in Current Use Assessment
State Capitalization Rate
Arizona Federal Land Bank (FLB) rate + 1.5%
Connecticut* 5 year rolling average (95%) of Farm Credit Service (FCS) rate + state tax 
rate
Illinois 5 year average FLB rate
Massachusetts 60 month average of FLB rate
North Dakota 12 year average of St. Paul FLB rate
Oregon 5 year average of FLB rate + effective tax rate
Utah 5 year average of FLB rate
South Carolina FLB rate + effective local tax rate + risk adjustment (15%) + 0.3% for non­
liquidity
Wisconsin 5 year average of loan rate
Wyoming 5 year average of Omaha FLB rate
Sources: Kansas Department o f Revenue, 2002; Connecticut Farm Bureau, 2005
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Table .1.3: Worksheet for Estimating the Use Value of Agricultural Land in Prince 
Edward County, Virginia
1. Estimated net return per acre $3.58
2. Capitalization Rate Components
i) Interest rate component
ii) Effective tax rate component
iii) Rate without risk component
iv) Risk component
v) Rate with flood risk component
0.0717
0.0042
0.0759 (sum i and ii) 
0.0038 (0.05 times iii) 
0.0798 (sum iii and iv)













I 418 1.5 627
II 21,273 1.35 28,719
III 10,617 1 10,617
IV 8,196 0.8 6,557
Total 40,504 46,519
Soil Index Factor 1.149
5. Use value adjusted by land class
Class Land Index4 Without Risk With Risk
I 1.31 $61.7 58.7
II 1.17 $55.1 52.4
III 1.00 $47.1 $44.8
IV 0.69 $32.5 30.9
V 0.52 $24.5 23.3
Source: Bruce & Groover, 2010
4 Land Index = Productivity Index/Soil Index Factor
5 For additional estimates visit http://usevaIue.agecon.vt.edu/
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Table 1.4: Flood Insurance Claims in New Hampshire at County Level
County Total Losses* 
Reported by NFIP6 
(1978-2012)












* Includes all losses regardless of whether losses have been fully paid, not fully paid or 
closed without payment.
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012
6 NFIP: National Flood Insurance Program
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Table 1.5: Soil Potential Index (SPI) Calculation in New Hampshire
Soil Type: Charlton Fine Sandy Loam, 3 to 8 Percent Slopes, Very Stony7









Water table greater than 6' 0 0 0 0
Slope range 3 to 8 percent 2 1 0 0
Bedrock greater than 6' 0 0 0 0
Available water capacity: 4.8" 0 0 0 0
Stones cover 1 to 3 percent of the surface 18 ' 5 18 2
Soil permeability 0.6 -  6.0 in/hr 0 0 0 0
Mean annual soil temperature greater than 47 F. 0 0 0 0
- 20 6 18 2
CDr_ 100-(20  + 6) + 100-(18 + 2) _ 74 + 80 nn1 — -------------------------------------- —   — II
1 Worksheets required in determining ranking for different soil characteristics can be obtained from the Soil Conservation Service, New Hampshire 
Department o f  Agriculture
Table 1.6: Current Use Land Assessment Ranges (Per Acre) in New Hampshire

















1995 $25-425 $46-90 $15-27 $30-66 $50-75 $85-128 $43-65 $68-104 $50-75 $15
1996 $25-425 $46-90 $15-27 $30-66 $50-75 $85-128 $43-65 $68-104 $50-75 $15
1997 $25-425 $46-90 $15-27 $30-66 $50-75 $85-128 $43-65 $68-104 $50-75 $15
1998 $25-425 $46-90 $15-27 $30-66 $50-75 $85-128 $43-65 $68-104 $50-75 $15
1999 $25-425 $55-103 $15-33 $40-81 $40-81 $93-141 $47-72 $78-119 $78-119 $15
2000 $25-425 $55-103 $15-33 $40-81 $40-81 $100-152 $51-78 $82-125 $82-125 $15
2001 $25-425 $63-115 $15-36 $44-87 $44-87 $112-170 $55-84 $91-137 $91-137 $15
2002 $25-425 $63-115 $15-36 $44-87 $44-87 $112-170 $55-84 $91-137 $91-137 $15
2003 $25-425 $63-115 $15-36 $44-87 $44-87 $112-170 $55-84 $91-137 $91-137 $15
2004 $25-425 $63-115 $15-36 $44-87 $44-87 $112-170 $55-84 $91-137 $91-137 $15
2005 $25-425 $73-130 $15-44 $49-94 $49-94 $126-191 $62-94 $99-150 $99-150 $15
2006 $25-425 $73-130 $15-44 $49-94 $49-94 $126-191 $62-94 $99-150 $99-150 $15
2007 $25-425 $73-130 $15-44 $49-94 $49-94 $126-191 $62-94 $99-150 $99-150 $15
2008 $25-425 $73-130 $15-44 $49-94 $49-94 $126-191 $62-94 $99-150 $99-150 $15
2009 $25-425 $86-130 $20-34 $49-74 $49-74 $128-192 $57-86 $86-129 $86-129
2010 $25-425 $97-146 $20-36 $43-64 $43-64 $138-207 $55-82 $76-114 $76-114 $20
2011 $25-425 $97-146 $20-36 $43-64 $43-64 $138-207 $55-82 $76-114 $76-114 $20
2012 $25-425 $91-137 $31-46 $22-34 $22-34 $125-188 $57-85 $47-71 $47-71 $20
Source: New Hampshire Current Use Criteria Booklets (New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration, 1995-2012)
Figure 1.1: Transfer of Development Rights
Development
Rights
Preservation Zone Growth Zone__
Financial
Compensation
Sending Area Receiving Area
Source: Platt, 1996
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Figure 1.2: Farm Credit Service (FCS) Interest Rates 1996 -2 0 1 1  by District
2
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—  Sacramento 
— » Wichita
Source: Internal Revenue Bulletins 1996-2011, IRS
Columbia (AgFirst, FCB) -  Delaware, District o f Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
Sacramento (U.S. Agbank, FCB) -  Arizona, California, Hawaii, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah
St. Paul (AgriBank, FCB) -  Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Wisconsin
Omaha (AgriBank, FCB) -  Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming
Spokane (CoBank, FCB) -  Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington
Springfield (CoBank, FCB) -  Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont
Texas, FCB -  Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas
Wichita (U.S.Agbank, FCB) -  Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma
29
Figure 1.3: Springfield District Farm Credit Service (FCS) Interest Rates 1993 -
2011
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* Actual
•FCS 3 Year Average 
'FCS 5 Year Average
Source: Internal Revenue Bulletin, Department o f Treasury, Internal Revenue Services, 
Issues 1996-2011
*These interest rates are for Farm Credit District Springfield, MA (CoBank, ACB). 
Served states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
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Figure 1.4: County Level Full Value Tax Rates* in New Hampshire 1999 -  2011



















* Full value tax rates are per $1000 value.
Source: New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration
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C h a p t e r  2
2 C urrent  U se  P roperty  T a x a tio n  in C o n se r v in g  N e w  H a m psh ir e  La n d : A n 
E m pir ica l  In v e st ig a t io n  U sing  M u ltiple  Im pu t a tio n s
2.1 Introduction
In 1973, the New Hampshire General Court enacted the current use (CU) law, known 
as RSA 79-A (New Hampshire’s Current Use Coalition, 2007) in response to the 
campaigning done by the New Hampshire’s CU coaltion, officially known as the 
Statewide Program o f Action to Conserve our Environment (SPACE). Since then, the CU 
program in New Hampshire is considered to be the cornerstone o f the state’s 
conservation efforts, and nearly 3 million acres (about 50 percent o f New Hampshire’s 
land) are enrolled in the New Hampshire CU program (see table 2.1). The CU program in 
New Hampshire can be considered one o f  the state programs that incorporate some of the 
better land-conserving design features (New Hampshire’s Current Use Coaltion, 2007).
CU assessment programs have led to many studies on the subject, ranging from 
theoretical models to empirical studies. Most empirical studies on CU programs generally 
agree that such programs provide a substantial tax relief to participating landowners 
(Brockett, Gottfried & Evans, 2003; Malme, 1993; Polyakov & Zhang, 2008). Despite 
the benefits gained by participating landowners, CU programs are often criticized. The 
most cited criticism regards the opportunity gained, by land speculators. According to
32
Malme (1993), the penalty for the withdrawal from the CU program is not significant for 
major developers. The requirement o f minimum acreage, use o f land for the promised use 
for the last five years and binding contracts help to divert such speculators. Another 
criticism is the revenue loss for towns. This concern leads to another critique: does this 
imply a tax shift to homeowners and business properties? However, the concerns on the 
shift o f tax burden or the loss o f revenue are counterbalanced by the requirement o f fewer 
public services for undeveloped land areas compared to residential areas and most o f the 
commercial lands (American Farmland Trust, 2004). Some studies show evidence that 
casts doubt upon the success o f the program in preserving undeveloped land (Brockett, 
Gottfried & Evans, 2003; Parks & Quimio, 1996; William, Gottfried, Brockett & Evans, 
2004). According to Brockett et. al. (2003), the reasons for ineffective land conservation 
outcomes include development considerations that overpower the incentives provided by 
the program and lenient CU withdrawal penalties.
Despite the aforementioned arguments against the program, there are theoretical 
models that predict favorable outcomes from the program and have identified several 
testable implications (Anderson & Grififlng, 2000; Capozza & Helsley, 1989; England & 
Mohr, 2003). However, empirical studies that verify the theoretical claims o f these 
models are limited in number. New Hampshire’s CU program is used as a case study to 
verify some theoretical claims contained in earlier studies by the authors referenced 
above.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution o f forest and agricultural land enrolled in the 
program in 2009. As shown, about 60-70 percent o f land enrolled in the NH program is 
forested land, whereas about 30 percent o f land is agricultural land. Most of the farmland
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enrollment in the program can be found closer to the Seacoast, the Merrimack River 
Valley and the Connecticut River Valley (Vermont and Massachusetts borders). This 
specific distribution o f agricultural land enrollment in the CU program is worth exploring 
further. Therefore, the first objective o f this chapter is to explore specific determinants of 
CU enrollment and CU withdrawal in New Hampshire over the period 1999-2011. Since 
the CU program is considered to be the major land conservation program, I study the 
significance of the CU program in conserving land, using data related to the CU program 
in New Hampshire. A drawback o f available data for this chapter is a high percentage of 
missing observations in some variables, which could hinder the reliability o f research 
findings. In addition to exploring the characteristics that lead to enrollment in and 
withdrawal of land from the CU program, this paper also focuses on some of the well 
known missing data statistical techniques. The missing data treatment methods compared 
are simple deletion, mean imputation and multiple imputation techniques. Hence, the 
second objective o f this paper is to compare existing missing data treatment techniques 
and carry out the New Hampshire case study analysis.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the theoretical models and hypotheses are 
summarized. The next section describes data, methodology and model specifications. 
Then I discuss the multiple imputations technique I used to treat missing data in the New 
Hampshire case study. Then I present results obtained using panel data analysis. The 
chapter concludes with a summary o f key findings and a discussion on possible 
suggestions for successful implementation o f the CU program in New Hampshire.
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2.2 Conceptual Models Used for the Analysis and Hypotheses
This section summarizes the theoretical models used to generate predictions about 
CU programs. The models include the effects o f Central Business Districts (CBD), 
property tax rates, withdrawal penalty and population growth on land values. The value 
of land is determined by four distinct components (Anderson, 1986; Capozza & Helsley, 
1989). The first component is the value o f accessibility, which depends on the 
transportation cost and the distance to the CBD. Close proximity to the CBD and 
accessibility increase land value (see figure 2.3). It is assumed that access to the CBD is 
no longer relevant at distances greater than Z*. The second component o f land value is 
the conversion value. The presence o f conversion value corresponds to a considerable 
value hike in lands located within a certain distance from (Z*) CBD. The third 
component of land value is the anticipated value o f future rent increase. This expected 
rent increase depends on the distance to the CBD. It is assumed that the expected future 
rent increases are higher at the urban fringe.
The fourth and final component o f land value is the CU value, which does not 
depend on the distance to the CBD. When we take these four components into 
consideration, it is clear that land prices decline with increases in distance to CBD. 
Therefore, the land parcels at the urban fringe face higher real estate market values and as 
a result, higher property taxes. Hence, landowners with agricultural or forestland at the 
urban fringe are more inclined to enroll in the CU program. The two business districts 
considered for empirical analysis for this study are Boston, MA and Manchester, NH. 
Following the land-value models proposed in the literature, this paper hypothesizes a 
higher proportion of CU enrollment and lower CU withdrawal in towns closer to Boston
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and Manchester, as opposed to towns located away from the above two cities. When 
consider the effect of population growth on rural land development, I hypothesize a 
decline in the acres o f land enrolled in the CU program with higher growth in population. 
There are three possibilities when the effect o f change in population on land allocation is 
considered. First, new populations may settle in a land that is already developed, thereby 
increasing urban density. Second, the new population may settle on undeveloped land 
that is enrolled in the CU program or, third, on land that is not enrolled in the program 
(see figure 2.4). Therefore, changes in land enrollment in the CU program due to changes 
in population may be hard to capture with simple population statistics. However, I test the 
hypothesis that an increase in population results in a decline in land enrolled in the CU 
program and higher withdrawal from the program. I assume if there is a higher growth 
rate in population, then there is a decline in the acres o f land enrolled in the CU program 
to accommodate the increased population.
The theoretical model developed by England & Mohr (2003) implies some important 
testable predictions about CU assessment. Their inter-temporal model o f land 
development includes features specific to the CU program. Following England & Mohr 
(2003), this paper hypothesizes higher CU enrollment and lower CU withdrawal in towns 
with higher property tax rates and higher average land value. According to the model, a 
landowner decides the timing o f development (D ), considering the pecuniary benefits 
before/after the development (c and u) and non-pecuniary benefits (n) only before the 
development. Therefore, the owner chooses a time to develop the land when the present 
value o f her income stream is maximized. The model is:
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r D[c{t) + n(t)-TA (t)]e-r,dt -  P {U )e rD + f '“ ° rA(t)]e-r'dt (2.1)
J r=0  \ v / J t=D_________
Present value o f  returns Present value Present value o f
to undeveloped °* P f^ alty  returns to developed
land, net o f  taxes on Wlf'1drawal land, net o f  taxes
In the above, t  is the property tax rate, r is the owner’s discount rate, P is the 
penalty fee and t denotes time. Following England & Mohr (2003) model predictions, 1 
hypothesize an increase in land enrollment for the program with higher r  and higher 
aerage land value (ALV). I use the term full value tax rate (FVTR) to denote the x of 
England & Mohr (2003) model. ALVjt in town is calculated as follows:
Residential land value + Commercial and Industrial land value
ALVit = ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total land -  Non taxable conservation and CU  land
This chapter also focuses on exploring the influence of daily traffic in a town on 
CU enrollment and CU withdrawal, hence development pressure. According to Ni et al. 
(2005) and Nordback et al. (2011), federal transportation funds are linked to vehicle 
miles travelled (VMT) and are calculated based on annual average daily traffic (AADT). 
(Ni, Leonard, Guin, & Feng, 2005; Nordback et al., 2011). With higher volumes in 
AADT, the flow o f federal funding may increase the development pressure in town, 
resulting in lower CU enrollment and higher CU withdrawal.
Monetary benefits landowners receive by enrolling their land in the CU program 
in New Hampshire are promising. However, if a landowner decides to withdraw land 
from the CU program, a withdrawal penalty, known as land use change tax (LUCT) is 
imposed in New Hampshire. LUCT in New Hampshire is calculated based on the market 
value o f land at the time of sale. Although, LUCT is not used as a variable in this chapter,
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LUCT and land withdrawal data indicate a disturbing problem - the missing data issue. In 
addition, some AADT were also missing due to the nature o f  data collection. In the 
section 2.4.1 a detailed explanation is presented on the above missing data. The values 
that are missing from AADT, LUCT and land withdrawn could not be ignored in the 
analysis. In treating missing data, I compared three missing data treatment techniques -  
simple deletion, mean imputation and multiple imputations, which are described in the 
following section.
2.3 Comparison of Missing Data Treatment Methods
Many techniques have been developed in the past as a solution for the missing data 
issue (Carter, 2006). However, researchers often use ad-hoc approaches (Honaker & 
King, 2010; Wayman, 2003) in handling missing data, which may ultimately do more 
harm than good. The approaches may include simple listwise deletion, mean substitution, 
and missing data imputation etc. Researchers agree about strengths and weaknesses o f 
each method.
Listwise deletion or complete case analysis is the deletion o f  observations that have 
missing values on one or more o f the variables in the data set. This means that the 
researcher removes all the records that have missing data on any variable. Listwise 
deletion is the default in most statistical software, but it may lead to significant sample 
size reduction available for the analysis depending on the proportion o f  discarded cases. 
If the discarded cases represent only a small proportion o f the entire data set, then listwise 
deletion may be a reasonable approach (Honaker & King, 2010; Wayman, 2003). In 
listwise deletion, missing data are treated as missing completely at random. However, if
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the proportion of missing data increases and discarded cases differ systematically from 
the rest (data not missing completely at random), then listwise deletion may add serious 
bias towards estimates.
In some cases, the missing observations are replaced by an average o f the variable; 
this process is known as mean imputation or mean substitution. Although this is 
considered to be a mean preserving method, it affects the marginal distribution o f data. 
All the above methods do not eliminate the possibility o f  biased results (Philips & Chen, 
2011). Although mean substitution approach preserves the marginal distribution of the 
variable, it affects the covariance and correlations between variables (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005).
2.3.1 Multiple Imputation
In 1987, Rubin proposed a multiple imputations scheme to treat missing data. 
Multiple imputation (MI) method has been widely used over the past by researchers in 
many study areas (Norman, 2009; Phillips & Chen, 2011; Kammerer, 2009; Siche et al, 
2008). The first stage is the creation o f  set copies with the original data set and the 
generation o f  missing values using an appropriate modeling procedure. Then, any 
standard analysis can be performed with the new imputed data set.
According Rubin (1987), multiple imputations have several desirable features. Such 
features include its usability in any kind o f analysis without specialized software, its yield 
of unbiased estimates, and the possibility o f obtaining accurate estimates for standard 
errors etc. The literature with formal recommendations for the number o f imputations is 
very minimal. It is often cited that 3 to 10 multiple imputations are enough to obtain
valid inferences (Kammerer, 2009; Royston, Carlin, & White, 2009; Rubin, 1987, 1996).
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According to Rubin (1987), the efficiency o f an estimate based on m imputations is given
by where y  represents the rate o f  missing information. Accordingly, the
V
efficiencies achieved for various values o f  m and rates o f missing information are shown 
in table 2.1. As shown, if the rate o f missing information is very high, increasing the 
number of imputations will increase the efficiency o f estimates. However, if the rate of 
missing information is lower (10%), then the gain is minimal with higher number of 
imputations.
In MI, each set o f imputations creates a complete data set. The first step of the MI 
method is to estimate multiple values for each missing datum. This simulates multiple 
random draws from the data in order to estimate the unknown parameter. Then, each o f 
the data set can be analyzed using standard complete data analysis (Schreuder & Reich, 
1998). Multiple imputations include multiple copies o f original data and imputations of 
missing values as required by the researcher (Carlin, Galati, & Royston, 2008). 
Accordingly, this method has three general stages (Rubin, 1996). In the first and second 
steps, missing values are replaced with a set o f multiple plausible values and then 
analyses are performed on each imputed data set. In the last step, results obtained from 
multiple data sets are consolidated to get final estimates. Figure 2.5 shows the above 
three steps of the multiple imputation process.
Multiple imputations can be performed without a model or can be based on a model 
determined by the researcher (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In the regression based model 
approach, multiple imputations are done through a process o f iterations. That is, missing 
values are iteratively generated based on the observed variables (Carlin et al., 2008).
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2.4 Data and Methodology
This chapter evaluates the significance o f the CU program in conserving land in New 
Hampshire by considering the effect o f population change, the distance to two central 
business districts (CBDs), the average value o f residential land (ALV), and the full value 
tax rates (FVTR) on the proportions o f land enrolled and withdrawn in the New 
Hampshire CU program. In addition, this chapter compares different missing data 
treatment techniques.
The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (NHDRA) maintains 
comprehensive information on CU taxation at the town level. After eliminating some 
possible outlier towns8, 231 towns were considered for this analysis. The towns not 
included for the analysis are New Castle, Hart's Location and Newfields. The data 
required to determine CU program success are from NHDRA annual reports and CU 
reports from 1999-2011. NH population statistics are from the U.S. Census. The 
economic and developmental influences emanating from Boston are considerable for 
most of the New Hampshire towns, especially in the Southern portion o f the state. 
Therefore, this study considers Boston as one o f the Central Business Districts in the 
analysis, in addition to Manchester, which is the largest city in New Hampshire. The 
distance to each business district from each town is from Google map data9. Easy access 
to cities helps us to understand the development pressure for towns. Average Annual 
Daily Traffic (AADT) data are used to assess development pressures and AADT data 
were obtained from the New Hampshire Department o f  Transportation (DOT) traffic data
8 With very high land values
9 www.maps.google.com
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for the years 1999-2011. AADT data used in this study are averages o f traffic data 
collected from roads classified as collectors and arterials by New Hampshire DOT.
According to Berry (1993), most o f the land withdrawn from the CU program in New 
Hampshire has been converted to residential land as opposed to commercial land. 
Average value o f land could be a considerable determinant in enrolling land in the CU 
program (England & Mohr, 2003). Therefore, this study uses average value o f  land as a 
determinant in enrolling land in the CU program.
2.4.1 Missing Data Treatment
This paper focuses on the missing data issue in the dataset before proceeding to 
detailed analyses. In the NH dataset, only 70 percent o f the observations reported 
contained no missing data, whereas about 30 percent o f observations had at least one 
missing value. Most of the missing data were found in the variables CU acres removed 
and AADT in towns. According to New Hampshire CU law, lands withdrawn from the 
program are subjected to a penalty o f 10 percent o f market value; this is known as Land 
Use Change Tax (LUCT). Therefore, the CU acres removed and LUCT both should have 
been reported for any observation, if any land is withdrawn from the CU program. Most 
notably, AADT data were missing from certain years. Cases of missing data for those two 
variables were easily observable. A method to replace those missing values was 
important.
Missing data treatment techniques used are complete case analysis, mean substitution 
and multiple imputations. In the complete case method, observations with at least one 
missing value were dropped from the analysis. In mean substitution, mean values o f
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variables were used to replace missing values (Osborne, 2013). Multiple imputations of 
this chapter were done using STATA’s chained equations with commands ice and mim. 
The ice command creates the desired number o f  data sets and performs analyses across 
created data sets, which are followed by the pooling o f estimates to derive final estimates.
Missing data treatment analysis in this chapter is done in two steps. First, 1 use a sub­
set of original data containing variables with no missing values to compare the three 
missing data treatment techniques to find out the best method to treat missing data in the 
original data set. Second, missing data in the original data set is treated with the 
recommended technique from the first step. More details on the two steps o f the missing 
data analysis are given below.
In the first step, the chosen variables with no missing values are full value tax rate 
-(FVTR), average value o f residential land (ALV), population change and distances to two 
central business districts in .the study. In order to understand which method is more 
appropriate to treat missing values, I compared results generated from the sub-set of data 
with no missing values to the sub-set o f data with artificially created missing 
observations. For this analysis, missing values for FVTR, ALV and population change 
were randomly inserted at missing rates o f 5, 10 and 15 percent. Analyses were done 
using random effect panel data technique. All missing data treatments were compared to 
the results of the sub-set of data with no missing values. Multiple imputation technique 
was proven to be more effective in generating similar results to the results obtained from 
the sub-set of data with no missing values. Based on the results from the first step, the 
final analysis was performed after treating original data with three multiple imputations
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(Carlin et al., 2008; Philips & Chen, 2011; Rubin, 1996). The models used in the analyses 
are described in the following section.
2.4.2 Model Specifications and Panel Data Analysis
In determining the factors that could influence landowners’ decision to enroll and 
withdraw land from the CU program in New Hampshire, I estimate the following model:
Y ^ f ( X ^ iX f BD) + ell (2.2)
In this model Yit represents proportion o f  farmland or forestland (compared to total
land), percentage of CU land enrolled in the New Hampshire CU program or CU land
withdrawn from the program at town level; Xf, is a vector o f time dependent variables
that might influence CU enrollment, CU withdrawal or land conservation. The variables 
considered are FVTR, ALV, population change (for 1,000) in' each year, average annual 
daily traffic data (AADT), tax savings on CU land and percentage o f CU acres receiving 
further tax reduction due to permitted recreational activities. The vector X f BD contains 
two dummy variables - identifying towns located within 50 miles from Boston, MA and 
Manchester, NH.
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2.5 Results and Discussion
In this study I was particularly interested in comparing some o f the existing 
missing data treatment methods and in understanding land conservation efforts in New 
Hampshire in relation to the CU property taxation program. This section first presents 
the summary statistics o f original data and then the results o f missing data treatment 
comparison on the sub-set o f data. Finally, discusses the results o f the random effect 
panel data models o f original CU data treated with 3 multiple imputations.
In New Hampshire, property taxes contribute to a larger share o f state and local 
government tax revenue than in most other states. Hence, higher property taxes could be 
a burden for agricultural and forestry landowners if the income from land is not enough 
to cover property tax bills. Therefore, most landowners with undeveloped land are 
inclined to seek property tax relief. Since the initiation o f  the CU program, about 50% of 
land in New Hampshire has been consistently enrolled in the program in each year. Table
2.2 shows the percentage of land enrolled in the CU program in New Hampshire from 
1999-2011. As shown in table 2.3, the average FVTR for the study period is $18.5 for 
$1000 o f estimated market value. The FVTR are calculated using mill rates and 
equalization ratio. The equalization ratio is the percentage ratio o f the total assessed 
values to the total market values o f municipality’s properties. An equalization ratio of 
100 implies that a town is assessing properties at 100% of market value, and that, most 
likely, reassessments are done every year. An equalization rate less than 100 means 
properties in a town are assessed less than the market value. However if the equalization 
rate is greater than 100, properties in the town are assessed, on average, higher than 
market value for property tax purposes. According to New York State’s Department o f
Taxation and Finance (2013), this could be due to property value decrease since the last 
reassessment or due to not adjusting assessment values downward. In New Hampshire 
towns, the average equalization rate is 90.6 with a minimum o f  35 and a maximum of 
143. An equalization rate of 90.6 means that, on average, property taxes are calculated 
based on 90.6% of property’s market value.
The percentage o f missing values in variables o f  interest is given in table 2.4. As 
shown, the highest missing values are reported in AADT, CU acres removed and LUCT 
(30%). To avoid any possibilities o f bias due to missing data, the original data needed to 
be treated with some missing data technique. In order to compare the three missing data 
treatment techniques, a sub-set o f original data variables with no missing data (NMIS) 
was chosen, and regression results were compared with randomly assigned missing 
values at rates of 5, 10 and 15%. Table 2.5 shows the results o f missing data treatments. 
The results of the three methods are compared with the regression results o f NMIS data/
As shown in table 2.5 when the rate o f  missing data is 5%, regression results from 
all missing data treatments are much similar to the results reported with no missing 
values. More precisely, complete case results are closely comparable. However, when the 
rate of missing data is 10%, estimates obtained from data treated with complete case 
analysis and mean substitution deviate considerably from estimates with no missing 
values. However, estimates obtained after treating data with multiple imputation shows 
closely comparable estimates to estimates from NMIS data. Also, results show much 
closer estimates from 3, 5 and 8 imputations. When the rate o f missing values increases 
to 15%, estimates generated from mean substitution and complete case analyses are not 
close to the estimates from NMIS data as in the case with 10% missing values. However,
46
estimates obtained from 3 and 5 imputations provide promising results (see table 2.6). 
Compared to mean substitution and complete case analyses, results reported of data 
treated with multiple imputations have maintained the consistency o f  estimates regardless 
of the percentage missing. As suggested by Rubin (1987), my results show that marginal 
efficiency gain is lower by higher imputations compared to fewer imputations (see table 
2 .2).
In the CU data, about 12 percent o f  data were missing for the variables chosen for 
further analysis. With the missing data treatment results, 3 and 5 multiple imputations 
with 15% missing values generated closely comparable results compared to NMIS data 
set. Therefore, analyses done with the original CU data were restricted to 3 imputations, 
considering the comparable results and less marginal gain that could yield with higher 
imputations.
According to the theoretical predictions in the CU literature, I hypothesized an 
increase in CU enrollment (overall, farm or forest) with higher FVTR, higher AADT (due 
to development pressure), higher average land value and in towns located within 50 miles 
of Boston or Manchester. Also I assumed an increase in CU enrollment with further tax 
reductions given for agreeing to provide recreational adjustment and a decrease in CU 
enrollment with increases in population and tax on CU land (due to high assessment of 
CU land). Models 1-3 consider the total CU land percentage, the farmland CU land 
percentage and the forestland CU land percentage as dependent variables.
Table 2.7 shows the results o f random effect panel data regression models on 
original data. As expected, towns with higher FVTR tend to have a significant increase in 
percentage o f land enrolled in the CU program. Similarly, a higher percentage o f
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forestlands is also enrolled in the program in towns with higher FVTR (model 3). 
However, the FVTR estimate does not support the hypothesis when considering the 
percentage o f farmland enrolled in the program (model 2). However, the above result is 
not statistically significant. As expected, a higher percentage o f  farmland is enrolled in 
the program in towns closer to Boston and Manchester. Hence, farmland owners at the 
urban fringe are most likely inclined to get the tax relief from CU enrollment. However, 
the influence of two CBDs does not support the hypothesis when considering forestland 
and overall CU land percentage in the program. As expected, higher ALV leads to a 
significant increase in CU enrollment (models 1 and 3).
When considering the population growth, this study suggests a decrease in overall 
CU land enrolled in the program when there is an increase in population. Also, the results 
suggest an increase in CU enrollment if CU lands are allowed to receive additional tax 
deductions if recreation is permitted for the public. As expected, towns with higher 
development pressure (denoted from AADT) have a higher percentage o f farmland 
enrolled in the CU program (see table 2.7, models 1-3). As discussed before, CU 
taxation depends on income potential o f  land. Hence, accurate assessment o f CU land is 
important. As shown in model 1-3, if property taxes on CU land are higher (i.e. if CU 
assessments are higher), then this could lead to decreases in CU enrollment.
This paper also analyzes the factors that could lead to CU withdrawal. As 
hypothesized, if towns are closer to Boston or Manchester, CU withdrawal will be lower 
(model 4). As expected, withdrawal o f CU land will be higher if growth in population is 
higher. However, it is not significant. To capture the effect o f population growth on CU 
land proportion in the program may be difficult, because new populations may not
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necessarily settle only on CU land. Rather, they may be settling in already developed land 
or in lands that are not entitled for preferential tax benefits (see figure 2.4).
2.6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
In New Hampshire, the CU program is considered the corner stone in conserving 
undeveloped land from being developed for urbanized uses, such as commercial or 
residential development. Having about 50% of New Hampshire land enrolled in the CU 
program shows the importance o f the program in New Hampshire. This chapter focuses 
on finding the factors that determine the performance o f the CU program in New 
Hampshire using data from 1999-2011 is used for analyses.
In addition, this chapter also focuses on missing data issue in research. As 
suggested in past literature, ignoring missing data could lead to serious bias in research 
results. Therefore, three missing data treatment methods were compared to determine the 
most appropriate missing data treatment method for the data used in this study. Compared 
methods are complete case analysis (listwise deletion), mean substitution and multiple 
imputations. Results from missing data treatment suggest a couple o f important 
outcomes. According to the results, if the percentage o f missing data is low, then bias that 
results from missing data is low. Hence, all three methods generate almost similar results. 
However, as the percentage o f missing values increases, then the three methods used to 
treat missing data in this study generate considerably different estimates. Hence, if the 
missing value percentage is high, results o f  this paper suggest a lower number o f multiple 
imputations (3-5) are more appropriate to treat missing data compared to other methods. 
Therefore, missing data in the study were treated with 3 imputations for further analyses.
The CU program objective is to slow land development via providing tax relief 
for landowners if they promise to keep undeveloped land without converting it for more 
urbanized uses. This chapter focused on verifying how some factors could support the 
conservation of land in New Hampshire. CU information and related data for 231 towns 
for the period 1999-2011 were used for analyses. According to the results, property tax 
rates (FVTR) and average land value (ALV) o f a town have played major roles in 
landowners’ decision to-enroll land in the CU program. Also the results suggest higher 
land enrollment in towns with higher FVTR and higher ALV. Which suggest possible tax 
savings from the programs play an important role in enrolling land in the program. 
Following theoretical models, this paper also hypothesized an increase in CU enrollment 
if towns are located closer to central business districts (CBDs). However, this paper does 
not support the above hypothesis. Above theoretical claim about the influence o f CBDs is 
supported when considering the CU withdrawal model and suggests CU withdrawal is 
lower if a town is located closer to one o f the CBDs considered in the study.
In New Hampshire, most farmlands are located closer to the Seacoast, the 
Merrimack River Valley and the Connecticut River Valley (Massachusetts and Vermont 
borders), whereas forestlands are in the rest o f  the state. Therefore, theoretical model 
predictions of landowners’ behavior in enrolling land may be subjected to geographical 
distribution of farmland and forestland in New Hampshire (see figure 2.1) and need to be 
accounted for in further research work.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Efficiencies Achieved for Various Values o f m
r
m 0.1 0.3 0.5
3 97 91 86
5 98 94 91
10 99 97 95
20 . 100 99 98
Table 2.2: C urren t Use Acres in New H am pshire
















Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics on Land Characteristics, Property Taxes and Other Socio Economic Variables
Variable # o f
Obs.
Unit of Measurement Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Land CU land 3003 Percentage of total land 0.505 0.214 0.005 0.998
Farm land 3003 Percentage of total land 8.667 10.715 0 100
Farm CU 3003 Percentage of CU land 4.682 4.948 0 59.297
Forest land 2999 Percentage of total land 54.944 30.198 0 100
Forest CU 2999 Percentage of CU land 32.542 17.824 0 159.396
CU removed 2172 Percentage of CU land 1.867 10.654 0 100
CU removed 2172 Acres 119.872 867.725 0.04 14940.6
CU parcel size 2988 Acres 47.814 57.612 4.383 1073.70
Property Tax FVTR(t) 3003 For $1000 assessed value 18.598 5.172 5.403 41.104
Equalization ratio 2998 Ratio 90.635 15.071 34.8 143
Distance Boston 3003 Miles 99.781 41.675 33.9 218
Manchester 3003 Miles 57.67 35.663 0 167
Land Value Residential 3003 Dollars per acre 9678.78 15763.0 77.351 132497
Commercial 2858 Dollars per acre 1872.54 5002.89 0.086 42301.0
Current Use 3003 Dollars per acre 107.06 50.601 5.457 1365.30
Population Change 3003 Per 1000 11.367 38.776 -259.18 689.076
Average annual daily traffic 
(AADT)
2088 5965.48 5515.63 60 111887





CU percent of total land 0 0
Farm CU percent of total land 0 0
Forest CU percent o f total land 4 0.1
CU removed 831 27.7
Land use change tax (LUCT) 853 28.4
Total CU parcels 15 0.5
Average parcel size 15 . 0.5
Full Value Tax Rate (FVTR) 0 0
Acres receiving recreational 
adjustment
159 5.3
Distance to Boston 0 0
Distance to Manchester 0 0
Average value o f residential land 0 0
Population change 0 0
Average annual daily traffic (AADT) 915 30.5
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Table 2.5: Missing Data Treatments Results on the Sub-set of Data with 5% and 10% Missing


























































































































































































Table 2.6: Missing Data Treatments Results on the Sub-set of Data with 15% Missing
15% Missing
Imputations




Mean Subs. 3 5 8 10



























































































Probability values are given in parenthesis.
Table 2.7: Regression Results after 3 Imputations
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables CU Percent of 
Total Land
Farm CU of 
Total Land














































































Probability values are given in parenthesis. ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1
Table 2.8: Summarized Hypotheses and Results -  Current Use Enrollment





Full Value Tax Rate >0 Yes <0 No
Located 50 miles from Boston >0 No <0 Yes
Located 50 miles from Manchester >0 No <0 Yes
Average Land Value >0 Yes <0 Yes
Population Change <0 Yes >0 Yes
Recreational Adjustment >0 Yes <0 No
Average Annual Daily Traffic >0 Yes <0 No
Tax on per acre CU land <0 Yes >0 Yes
Figures
Figure 2.1: Current Use Forestland and Agricultural Land (%) in New Hampshire 
Towns -  2009
C U  o f  F o r e s t  0 9  
0 - 1 0
 | > 1 0  - 3 0
; > 3 0 - 5 0
'_____ | > 5 0 - 7 0
C C  o f  F a r m  0 9  
0-10
 > 1 0  -  3 0
! > 3 0  -5 0  
| > 5 0 - 7 0
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Figure 2.2: Current Use Land Change (%) in New Hampshire 1999 -  2009
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Value of Capital 
Improvement
Value of Expected 
Future Rent 
Increases
C urrent Use Land 
Rent
Z* Distance to
Sources: Anderson (1986) and Cappoza & Helsley (1989)
Figure 2.4: Effect of Change in Population on Land Allocation
Boston
Urban Areas (Developed 
Land)
A
Change in Population > 0
Current Use Land 
(CU Program)
Public and Private Land 




Figure 2.5: Multiple Imputation Process
Step 1: Impute Step 2: Analyze Step 3: Pool
Final estimatesDataset with 
missing values
Analysis resultsImputed datasets
o f each dataset
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C h a p t e r  3
3 Evalua tio n  of  C u rrent  U se P ro g r a m  F ea t u r e s  U sin g  D u r a tio n  An a l y sis
a n d  C o m peting  R isk  R e g r e ssio n s
3.1 Introduction
Urbanization and other forms o f  development often lead to higher market values 
of land. When these higher market values are reflected in increased property tax 
obligations, the owners may sell off parcels to cover their property tax bills. Over the past 
few decades, all U.S. states have responded to this tax-induced development by 
implementing various policies to keep land in its current rural use. The current use (CU) 
property taxation program, one o f such preferential taxation systems, has been present in 
the U.S. since 1956. CU valuation programs can result in considerable tax savings to 
landowners (Butler et al., 2010). In most states, lands utilized for agriculture or forestry 
(even open space land in some states) are eligible to receive this tax benefit from the 
program. CU programs operate at the state and local levels to provide incentives to 
private landowners who wish to keep their rural land intact without residential, 
commercial or industrial development.
Maryland was the first state to implement a preferential property taxation system, 
primarily due to a rapid increase in farmland price relative to net farm income after 
World War II (England, 2011). Thereafter, CU property taxation rapidly spread into other
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regions o f the country. However, CU programs are considerably different across states in 
terms o f enrollment requirement, CU assessment methods and penalties on withdrawal. 
Most notably, in some states even the preferential taxation program name is different. For 
example, the CU program in Pennsylvania is known as Clean and Green program 
(Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, 2013). Irrespective o f  such variations across 
programs, all preferential assessment programs provide considerable tax savings to 
landowners.
With the sole exception of Michigan, all other states have implemented some sort 
of CU assessment program during the years between 1956 and 1997. The reasons for 
implementation o f the program during these decades have not yet been fully explored. As 
stated in chapter 1, there are three types o f CU programs that can be identified as pure 
preferential assessment, deferred taxation or CU assessment with restrictive agreements. 
In pure preferential assessment, landowners enjoy lower property taxes on enrolled land 
in the CU program with no withdrawal penalties if a land is withdrawn, from the program. 
In contrast, if a CU program is categorized as deferred taxation, landowners enjoy the 
benefit o f lower property taxes while enrolled in the program and face a withdrawal 
penalty if a land is withdrawn from the program. Figure 3.1 shows the states with pure 
preferential assessment and deferred taxation.
Figure 3.2 shows the categories o f CU withdrawal penalties considered in this 
chapter, which are described as the second type o f CU programs in the literature. CU 
withdrawal penalties are broadly based on the market value at the time o f withdrawal or 
property tax savings received by the landowner after enrolling land in the program. CU 
program features vary considerably across states (see table 3.1) in terms of penalties that
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landowners face for withdrawal o f land from the program. As shown in table 3.1, CU 
withdrawal penalties are different depending on whether penalties are based on market 
value or roll-back, and the roll-back penalties are vastly different based on the number of 
years o f tax savings collected. Based on differences in CU withdrawal penalties, this 
chapter focuses on five categories o f CU withdrawal penalties. The distribution of 
withdrawal penalties is shown in figure 3.2. The two penalties based on market value at 
the time of sale are fixed percentage market value penalty and the sliding scale (declining 
percentage) market value penalty that varies with the length of enrollment time. The three 
penalties based on tax savings are the rollback penalties with fixed number o f  years, 
sliding-scale rollback penalties and rollback penalties that charge an additional interest on 
tax savings received.
The third type o f CU program is CU programs with restrictive agreements. 
Restrictive agreements refer to contractual obligations a participating landowner would 
enter upon enrolling land in the CU program. The contractual agreement usually 
obligates a landowner to keep land without developing it for certain number o f years, 
usually ten, with the option to renew each year thereafter. If a landowner changes the 
land use before the contract matures, more serious penalties are imposed. Therefore, the 
distinction between deferred taxation and restrictive agreements is not always clear 
(Collins, 1976; Keene, 1976), unless when considering the required length o f  enrollment. 
Unlike the other two types o f CU programs, restrictive agreements are considered to be 
least effective in awarding tax benefits to landowners. The reason is many owners do not 
prefer being locked in to an agreement for a longer time period. However, such 
contractual agreements are considered effective for bona fide farmers whose livelihood
64
depends on farming and are not common across states. Only a fewer states have 
restrictive agreements on agricultural land, whereas some states have restrictive 
agreements only for open-space land that qualifies for CU assessment. The states with 
restrictive agreements on agricultural land are California, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont and Washington, and Florida has restrictive agreements on open-space land. 
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of CU programs with restrictive agreements across 
states.
Owing to the fact that no prior empirical research has detailed the reasons for CU 
program implementation and variation in CU penalties, I focus on two main objectives in 
this chapter. The -first objective is to understand the determinants o f CU program 
implementation, and the second objective is to explore the reasons for specific 
distribution o f CU withdrawal penalties over the period 1949-1997. As discussed in detail 
in section 3.2, states-’ objectives o f program implementation and withdrawal penalties 
have been mainly attributed to land use patterns and disproportional property tax burdens 
based on income from agricultural lands. That is, states have implemented the program to 
discourage conversion of rural land to more urbanized uses. Based on those theoretical 
claims, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows. The first hypothesis is an 
increase in urban land and agricultural land increases the hazard rate o f implementing CU 
programs. When considering the imposition o f a withdrawal penalty, I hypothesize that 
states with a higher percentage o f urban land and states with higher dependency on 
property taxes as the state’s tax revenue source are more likely to impose a withdrawal 
penalty.
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Three econometric analyses are used in this chapter. The techniques are duration 
analysis, competing-risk regressions and random effect multinomial logit analysis. The 
third objective o f this chapter is to check the validity o f  the Independence o f Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) assumption, using the Hausman (Hausman & McFadden, 1984) test 
statistic. Although there are some widely accepted tests to assess the IIA assumption, 
various simulation studies have shown that these tests are not useful for assessing violations 
of the IIA assumption (Long & Freese, 2006) due to conflicting results provided from those 
tests. I used the Hausman and Wald statistics to compare whether those tests assess the 
- IIA assumption consistently. In considering competing risk regressions, the first model I 
focus on is the cause-specific Cox regression model (1972). The second competing risk 
regression model is the model proposed by Fine and Gray (Fine & Gray, 1999; Steele, 
Goldstein, & Browne, 2004).
The fourth objective o f this chapter is to compare the above two competing risk 
models in predicting CU withdrawal penalty imposition in the U.S. using 1949-1997 state 
level data. Detailed information on the above techniques is provided in the next section. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.3 provides information on data 
and empirical methodologies, and is followed by the results section. The last section 
provides conclusions and a discussion on possible avenues for further research on CU 
programs.
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3.2 State Objectives in Current Use Assessment Laws
The objectives o f implementing CU assessment law for property tax purposes must 
have been fairly different across states. However, those objectives fall into two major 
categories: improving equity o f property tax burden and influencing land development 
(Hady & Sibold, 1974).
The equity argument basically revolves around two main criterions: the ability to 
pay and the benefits received. According to the ability to pay criterion, agricultural 
landowners pay too much in property taxes. Disproportionately high property taxes are 
generally more common among agricultural landowners, because o f larger holding sizes. 
According to Hady and Sibold (1974), personal property taxes for agricultural 
landowners in the U.S. have hiked up to 7.6% in 1971 compared to 5.7% in 1961, which 
clearly supports the argument that there was a disproportionate increase in property tax 
burden for agricultural landowners in 1960s. This comparative rise in property tax burden 
compared to income o f agricultural landowners must have been an apparent reason for 
property tax reforms that initiated across the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s. According to 
the benefits received criterion o f the equity argument, agricultural landowners pay
A
property taxes entirely out o f proportion to the services they require from the local 
government. As suggested in the ability to pay and benefits received criterions, property 
taxes needed to be adjusted according to income potential o f agricultural land, which 
must have been a driving force behind CU program implementation by most o f the states.
The second objective o f CU program implementation considers the influence of the 
pace and direction of land development. Growing interest in the ecology and the 
environment, and the argument on property tax driven selling o f  land have been major
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reasons behind the land development argument (Hady & Sibold, 1974; Schoeplein & 
Schoeplein, 1972). The property tax driven land development may not be applicable for 
all agricultural landowners. Because some agricultural landowners may be sensitive to 
property taxes, others may not. For example, for some agricultural landowners, farming 
is part of their life and therefore, they may not be persuaded to sell land even when 
farming is not profitable. For such landowners, lower property taxes would make 
agricultural activities more profitable. Some other landowners may be holding on to 
agricultural activities until a profitable option opens up and will be willing to sell the 
agricultural land for more urbanized uses. Therefore, any property tax relief program is 
needed to distinguish bona fide agricultural landowners from speculators. As a result, 
some o f the CU programs impose penalties upon withdrawal o f  land from the CU 
program. However, it is always argued whether withdrawal penalties are enough to hold 
back land speculators from selling land.
The above arguments summarize the objectives behind CU assessment laws. 
According to Rodgers and Williams (1983), some states have combined the objectives in 
provisions o f their CU implementation. Table 3.2 summarizes the intents o f the CU 
value assessment in some states. As shown, the CU program has implemented with 
combined objectives to alleviate the disproportionate property tax burden from 
agricultural landowners, while providing a tax incentive to protect agricultural land from 
conversion.
It is clear that CU withdrawal penalties have been included in CU legislations to 
discourage short-term property tax gains or/and to discourage land conversion. However, 
the penalties have always been criticized too, because, there is a possibility that
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landowners may place a value on non-pecuniary benefits o f preserving land when 
deciding to enroll land in the program. This desire to provide non-pecuniary benefits by 
preserving the character of rural community and by ensuring continued flow o f 
ecosystem services that would benefit the public, should have been accounted for as 
“eco-system services” provided by a landowner by keeping rural land out of 
development. The argument would be to impose a withdrawal penalty only if the savings 
from CU taxation are greater than the actual total benefit, i.e “fair-retum,” a community 
would receive by preserving the rural character.
3.3 Data and Methodology
This study analyzes the factors that determined the implementation o f CU 
programs and imposition o f withdrawal penalties. The period o f analysis is from 1949- 
1997, which is broken down into four-year intervals, and is the period when most states, 
except Michigan, implemented some version o f a CU program. I used 50 states for the 
analysis o f CU implementation and only 49 states for analyses on CU withdrawal 
penalties. The data required for this study are from numerous sources., as described 
below. Land used for agricultural purposes, forestland, urban areas, total land area, 
farmland values and net farm income data are from the Economic Research Service 
(ERS) o f the United States Department o f Agriculture (USDA). Population statistics are 
from the U.S. Census Bureau. The data source for state level property tax revenue and 
income tax revenue is the Local Tax Collection Data o f the U.S. Census. The article by 
Hady & Sibold (1974) on CU programs and the Hunting Heritage o f the Multistate
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Conservation Grant Program10 were used to get CU program data. Details o f the 
empirical strategies used in this chapter are described below. Theoretical background of 
the models used in this chapter is given in the appendix (see pages 145-153).
As described in 3.1, three types o f CU programs can be identified. Figures 3.1 -
3.3 show the states with preferential assessment, differed taxation and restrictive 
agreements. Distinguishing between restrictive agreements from two other types of CU 
programs was challenging, and the duration analyses and competing risk regressions were 
done only considering preferential assessment and differed taxation.
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy: Duration Analysis
Objectives of this chapter are to understand the socio-economic and geographical 
factors that determined the implementation o f the program and imposition o f different 
penalty structures across states. The Cox Proportional Hazard model (Fox & Andersen, 
2005; Kiefer, 1988) has been widely used in duration (event-history) analysis studies and 
therefore is used in this chapter in determining the effect o f  different covariates on CU 
implementation and imposition o f a CU withdrawal penalty.
Assuming n states for the study, the Cox model has the form:
^  (t) = ex'J\  (0  = cfo  (0 , i = 1,2, n
where x t =(xn,x i2,  ,x jk) is the vector o f covariates; P  = (PX,P2,  ,Pk) is the vector
of regression coefficients; /i,(0 is the hazard rate calculated for each state; and i and h0{t) 
represent the baseline hazard rate. The baseline probability function corresponding to this
10 http wwvv. huntingheritage.org/
70
study is the probability o f CU program implementation (or withdrawal penalty 
imposition) when all covariates are zero.
This chapter analyzes the influence o f the following covariates (xt) :percentages 
of state’s land area that are urban land, rural transportation land11, farmland; net farm 
income, state’s per capita income, population growth, dependency on property tax and 
income taxes as state’s sources o f  revenue. As shown in figure 3.2, a specific regional 
distribution o f penalties is observed. Therefore, in addition to the above variables, this 
chapter uses regional dummy variables to analyze the determinants in penalty imposition. 
The regions considered are Midwest, West, Northeast and South. According to Kiefer 
(1998), the validity o f Cox regression results is conditional based on the assumption of 
proportional hazard for the model. If the proportional hazard assumption is violated, it 
indicates a time trend in the covariates studied. To overcome the biasness due to violation 
of proportional hazard, inclusion o f  time interactions o f covariates is needed. The 
covariates with time trends are identified by Schoenfeld (Fox & Andersen, 2005) 
residuals plots. Therefore, initial Cox regression results were tested for the proportional 
hazard assumption, using the Global test and using Schoenfeld residuals plots. 
According to Fox (2005) and Kiefer (1988), any systematic departures from a horizontal 
line o f Schoenfeld residuals plots are indicative o f non-proportional hazards. I f  the 
proportional hazards assumption is not violated, no further analyses were done. In the 
case o f proportional hazard assumption violation, interactions between covariates and 
time were included to the initial Cox regression model.
11 Rural transportation: Highways, roads, and railroad rights-of way, plus airport facilities outside an urban 
area
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3.3.2 Empirical Strategy: Random Effect Multinomial Logit Regression
Random effect multinomial logit (RMNL) is used by researchers when the 
dependent variable is in the form o f unordered discrete categories. In this chapter, 
dependent variables are the types o f penalties imposed by states when a CU property is 
withdrawn from the program. As described before, five types o f penalties were identified. 
To analyze the RMNL model, I used the STATA package’s Generalized Linear Latent 
and Mixed Models (GLLAMMs) as suggested by Carolyn et. al. (2010). A description 
on RMNL is provided in section A.2 o f the appendix (pages 148-149).
RMNL regression is used to find out which penalty categories should be 
combined for further analyses in competing risk regressions (see 3.3.3 for a discussion on 
competing risk regressions used in this chapter). Three RMNL regressions are 
considered. The dependent variables o f  the above RMNL regressions are different due to 
the number o f penalty categories. Wald statistics was used to test whether any penalty 
categories can be combined, and, with the last model, I used Hausman (Hausman & 
McFadden, 1984) statistic to test Independence o f Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
hypothesis.
3.3.3 Empirical Strategy: Competing Risk Regression Model
This section describes the estimations used to determine characteristics o f states 
that led to imposition o f a CU withdrawal penalty using competing risk models, as 
described by the cause-specific Cox regression model and the Fine and Gray (F&G) 
competing risk model. Choosing between the Cox model and F&G is important for the 
researcher. For example, if the researcher wants to compare the hazard rate o f a given
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event while ignoring the influence from other competing events, then the cause-specific 
Cox regression is recommended. In the F&G model, the incidence rate o f the event is 
calculated while considering the influence o f competing events. The F&G model is most 
widely used in competing risk models (Sun & Tiwari, 1995). This chapter focuses on 
providing a comparison of results using the above two competing risk regression models.
As discussed before, five CU penalty categories were identified along with states 
that have no CU withdrawal penalty. The period o f analysis is from 1949-1997, in which 
data reported in four-year intervals. The covariates (x,)used for the Cox and F&G 
models are: percentage o f urban land, rural transportation land, farmland, net farm 
income, state’s per capita income, population growth, dependency on property tax and 
income taxes as a state’s source o f revenue. In addition, regional dummy variables are 
used. To analyze competing risks models, I used R packages survival and cmprsk.
3.4 Results and Discussion
Visual display is important in recognizing and displaying data that could have any 
geographical distribution. Penalties for withdrawing land for residential or commercial 
development apply to landowners in 35 states. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of CU 
withdrawal penalties across the country. As shown, the states with some sort of CU 
withdrawal penalty are mostly concentrated in the East and West Coasts, whereas the 
states with no withdrawal penalty are to be found mostly in the Midwest. The states with 
no CU withdrawal penalties are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
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Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma and 
South Dakota.
State summary statistics for the years 1949-1997 are shown in table 3.3. As shown, 
the mean net farm income per acre declined from $64 in 1949 to $52 in 1997. Similarly, 
the percentage of farmland decreased to 4 percent in 1997, compared to 6 percent in 
1949. In contrast, the percentage o f urban land increased to 6.6 percent in 1997 from 2 
percent in 1949.
3.4.1 Duration Analysis Results
In the duration analysis, the factors considered for implementation o f the program 
are percentage of urban land, rural transportation land, farmland, net farm income, state’s 
per capita income, population growth, dependency on property tax and income taxes as 
state’s sources of revenue. The sample consists o f all states in the U.S. for the period 
1949-1997. As expected, urban land, farmland and population growth have increased the 
hazard rate o f implementing CU program. As shown in table 3.4, a one percent increase 
in urban land increases the CU implementation by seven percent, and a one percent 
increase in farmland increases the CU implementation by one percent. Also, the results 
suggest that if a state is highly dependent on property taxes as the source o f revenue, then 
a one percent increase in property tax dependence results in an 11 percent drop in CU 
implementation risk.
Above results are valid only if the proportional hazard assumption is not violated. 
To test the proportional hazard assumption, I used two tests: the Global test and the
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Schoenlfeld residual plots. Performing two diagnostic tests was important to cross 
validate the results. The statistics o f the Global test are shown in table 3.6. As shown 
from the Global test, the assumption o f proportional hazard cannot be rejected. The 
results from the Global test are also confirmed from Schoenlfeld residual plots as shown 
in figure 3.4.
Table 3.5 shows two Cox regression model results on CU withdrawal penalty 
imposition. As discussed before, the model on CU penalty imposition was also tested for 
proportional hazard assumption using Global test and Schoenlfeld residual plots on 
covariates focused on in this chapter. The Global test results (table 3.6) on the imposition 
o f withdrawal penalties suggest marginal evidence o f non-proportional hazard o f the 
model. Schoenlfeld residual plots in figures 3.5 and 3.6 also show noticeable departures 
from the time axis on the variables farmland, per capita income and Midwest regional 
dummy variables, which indicates that there is a time trend on those variables for penalty 
imposition. The variables with possible time trend needed to be corrected because of 
proportional hazard assumption violation. In this chapter, I use time interactions of the 
above mentioned suspected variables (farmland, per capita income and Midwest regional 
dummy) as a remedy for proportional hazard assumption violation. The results obtained 
after including time interactions are shown in table 3.5. As expected, the coefficient of 
the time interaction variable o f the Midwest regional dummy is negative (see table 3.5) 
and statistically significant. This implies that the hazard rate o f imposing a penalty in the 
Midwest is lower, and, overtime, the hazard rate in imposing a penalty has gone up. The 
results also suggest that an increase in farmland by 1% results in a decrease in hazard rate 
o f CU withdrawal penalty imposition by 86%. Also, the results suggest an increase in
hazard rate in imposing a CU withdrawal penalty with increase in per capita income in a 
state.
3.4.2 Random Effect Multinomial Regression Results on Combining Different
Penalty Categories
This section o f the analysis focuses on finding the validity o f IIA assumption by 
comparing Wald test and Hausman statistics. For this analysis, I initially considered six 
penalty categories (0-5) on CU withdrawal. Penalty category 0 represents states with no 
penalty; 1 represents states with a fixed market value penalty; 2 represents states with a 
sliding scale market value penalty; 3 represents the states that collect years o f tax savings 
as the penalty (roll-back penalty); 4 represents states that collect additional interest on 
calculated roll-back penalty; and 5 represents the states with sliding scale roll-back 
penalty. Multinomial Logit (MLogit) is often used in the case o f  unordered categorical 
dependent variables. Because o f the longitudinal nature o f the data, a random effect 
multinomial logit (RMNL) regression is used to analyze the reasons for specific 
distribution of penalty categories.
First, the data were analyzed using an RMNL model with six penalty categories. I 
also wanted to find out whether any o f  the above categories could be combined in the 
analysis. I used Stata’s Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Model (GLLAMM) 
command (Rabe-Hesketh, 2004) for RMNL analysis. RMNL results with six penalty 
categories are shown in table 3.8.
Following the first RMNL estimation, I performed the post estimation Wald test 
to verily whether any of the dependent variable categories could be combined. The null
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hypothesis o f the Wald test is as follows: All coefficients except intercepts associated 
with a given pair o f outcomes are zero (i.e., categories can be collapsed). According to 
Long and Freese (2006), if two dependent variables are indistinguishable, then combining 
the two dependent variables will yield more efficient estimates. Using RMNL estimates 
with six categories, the Wald test was performed. The statistics are shown in table 3.9. As 
shown, none o f the categories 1-5 should be combined with the ‘no penalty’ category. 
Wald test statistic results for categories 1 and 2 reject the hypothesis o f the Wald test and, 
as a result, penalty categories 1 and 2 were combined for further analysis. By combining 
the categories 1 and 2 (market value penalty and declining market value penalty with the 
length of enrollment), the six categories are reduced to five. Further analysis was carried 
out using RMNL analysis and the Wald test, to see any possible combination of 
dependent variables from five categories as shown in tables 3.10 and 3.11. As shown in 
table 3.10, the results still suggest possible combination o f  C l ' with C4' (market value 
and declining sliding scale roll back) or C2' with C4' (roll back penalty and declining roll 
back penalty). The C2' and C4' categories were combined which resulted in four penalty 
categories in total. Similarly, RMNL analysis and the Wald test were carried out with 
four penalty categories. Results are shown in table 3.12 and 3.13. As shown in table 3.13, 
none of the penalty categories needs to be combined for further analyses.
According to RMNL results using the four penalty categories (see table 3.12), 
states with higher percentage o f urban land have a higher probability o f imposing a 
market value penalty as opposed to roll-back penalties. This result is consistent with 
predictions from the duration analysis. Results suggest an important finding in terms o f 
assessing the imposition o f CU withdrawal penalties in relation to farmland in a state.
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That is, states with higher percentages o f farmland are less likely to impose any 
withdrawal penalties. This finding confirms one o f the objectives o f  CU programs: states 
have implemented this program to protect undeveloped lands in their current use rather 
than resort to conversion. Results suggest an interesting finding about state’s dependence 
on property taxes. My hypothesis was that penalties are imposed to recapture local 
government’s property tax forgone, especially when property tax contributes to a larger 
share o f the revenue of the state. As shown in table 3.12, results do not support the above 
hypothesis. Interestingly, the hazard rate o f imposing a CU withdrawal penalty rises with 
increases in income tax percent and per capita income in a state.
An assumption o f multinomial logit models is that outcome categories for the 
model have the property o f independence o f  irrelevant alternatives (IIA). That is, 
inclusion or exclusion o f categories should not have any effect on the results. In the 
literature there are arguments against this assumption casting doubts about the tests (Long 
and Freese, 2006) due to the generation o f conflicting results. As discussed before, I 
performed several RMNL analyses and Wald tests to understand the most appropriate 
combination of penalties for this chapter. I started with six penalty categories and my 
results suggested the combination o f some penalty categories. IIA test statistics for 
RMNL analyses with five and six penalty categories failed due to poor convergence of 
results o f the full model (with all penalty categories) and restricted form models (with 
one less penalty category). This proves that the Wald test statistics o f penalty category 
combination and Hausman test (IIA assumption) statistics complement each other. The 
Hausman test statistic used to check IIA assumption was performed after RMNL analysis 
with four penalty categories. Dropping the penalty category 3" (see table 3.7), a reduced
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form o f the RMNL model was tested against the full model. The Hausman test statistic is 
4.91 with a chi2 probability o f  0.426. The results suggest that the IIA assumption holds 
true for the RMNL model with four penalty categories. That is, inclusion or exclusion o f 
categories has no effect on results. The Wald test result also concluded that no further 
combination o f categories is required. Hence, penalties are independent from each other. 
Therefore, my results suggest that the Hausman test is valid to test IIA assumption.
As described before, CU penalties across states vary considerably, and I identified 
five penalty categories (see figure 3.2). The objective of RMNL analysis described in 
section 3.4.2 is to statistically understand whether any penalties are independent o f each 
other in order to consider them as belonging to separate penalty categories. With the 
results obtained from this section, the four independent penalty categories are used in 
competing risk regression analysis in the next section.
3.4.3 Competing Risk Regressions Results
This section presents a summary o f results obtained from competing risk 
regressions which are shown in tables 3.14 and 3 .15 .1 used cause-specific Cox regression 
and F&G models to analyze unordered penalty categories with an emphasis on the time 
of the penalty imposition.
In competing risk models, I hypothesized a correlation between the increase in 
hazard of penalty imposition and higher percentages o f urban area, population growth, 
state’s dependence on property taxes as a source o f tax revenue and an increase in rural 
transportation land percentage. Also, I hypothesized there would be a decrease in hazard
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with increases in farmland percentage in a state and state’s dependence on income taxes 
as a source o f tax revenue. As discussed before, in the cause-specific Cox (CSC) 
regression, competing risks are ignored in analyzing the effect o f covariates on a 
particular risk. In the F&G models, the incidence rate o f  the event is calculated while 
considering the influence o f competing events, i.e. F&G considers cumulative incidence 
function. The results are shown in table 3.14. According to Dignam et al. (2012), the 
coefficients of the CSC regression are interpreted as explained below. Let’s say a 
covariate from the CSC regression has a coefficient o f 0.033. That is, the covariate will 
increase the hazard rate by 3 percent for an increase in covariate by one unit 
[e(0.033) = 1.033]. If a covariate from CSC regression has a coefficient o f -0.033, then 
the covariate will decrease the hazard rate by 3 percent for an increase in covariate by one 
unit [e(-0.033) = 0.97].
As expected, the percentage o f urban land in a state significantly increases the 
hazard rate o f imposing a market value CU penalty. The same result is applicable for 
fixed value and sliding scale roll-back penalties, but not in roll-back with some interest 
rate added. Contrary to expectation, CSC regression results suggest a decrease in CU 
penalty imposition with an increase in state’s dependence on property taxes as a tax 
revenue source. Interestingly, the first two CSC regressions suggest a significant increase 
in CU penalty imposition with a state’s high dependence on income taxes as the tax 
revenue source.
When consider F&G competing risk model results, increases in urban land and 
farmland result in an increase in cumulative incidences o f imposing a market value
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penalty by about 5 percent (insignificant) and a decrease in cumulative incidence o f 
imposing a market value penalty by about 1 percent sequentially. As expected, 
cumulative incidence o f imposing market value penalty is increased by about 1 percent 
with respect to the increase in population by a unit. Also, the results suggest, if a state is 
dependent on property taxes as its tax revenue, such states are highly likely to impose a 
market value penalty. The dependence on property taxes in imposing a penalty is also 
supported by roll-back penalties with an added interest rate, but not fixed rate or 
declining rate roll-back penalties.
3.5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
CU assessment programs have become popular among private landowners across 
the United States. However, the diversity in program regulations across states are 
contributing to different rates o f enrollment, length o f enrollment and the timing of 
development for urban uses. Theoretical studies have examined CU programs in general. 
Due to the localized nature o f the program (at the town, county or state level) most o f the 
previous studies have focused on a single state instead o f  making cross-state 
comparisons. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature with a comprehensive 
comparison of CU programs across the United States.
This chapter focuses on finding the factors that determined CU program 
implementation and imposition o f withdrawal penalties across states. The duration 
analysis results support arguments that CU programs have been implemented to protect 
undeveloped land in their current use. Most o f the competing risk and RMNL models
81
suggest increasing hazard rates/probabilities o f imposing withdrawal penalties in states 
with higher percentage o f urban land and decreasing hazard rates/probabilities when 
imposing withdrawal penalties in states with higher percentage o f farmland. Also, 
competing risk models used in the chapter suggest that an increase in dependence on 
property tax revenue as a source o f tax revenue for states, increases the hazard of 
imposing a withdrawal penalty.
The results confirm that most CU programs have been implemented to support 
agricultural landowners and as a result o f the influence in growth in urban land. The 
duration model that incorporates time effects shows some noteworthy results. That is, 
over time the tendency of imposing penalties has declined in states with higher 
proportions o f farmland. Comparison o f cause-specific Cox regression and the F&G 
model in analyzing competing risks is important. Compared to the cause-specific 
regression, F&G results more closely correspond with my hypotheses on the covariate 
effect of CU withdrawal penalty imposition.
This chapter also aimed to test the validity o f IIA assumption in a RMNL setting. 
To verify the validity o f IIA assumption, I tested the independence o f penalty categories 
using the Wald test, and combined categories if two penalties were not different from 
each other. This independence o f penalties resulted in four penalty categories instead of 
the six penalty categories I started with. Interestingly, IIA assumption was violated when 
I used five and six penalty categories, proving that some penalty categories are not 
independent from each other. The Hausman statistic with four penalty categories 
(resulting from merging two penalties to other existing categories) proved the validity of 
IIA assumption in an RMNL setting.
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In this chapter, I focused on finding the factors that determined CU program 
implementation and imposition of withdrawal penalties in the U.S. However, it would be 
important to explore whether the differences in CU programs across states in terms of 
withdrawal and enrollment requirements led to differences in land development rates. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the above issue to find out whether different penalties have led to 
different rates in land development.
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Table 3.1: Current Use Program Summary
State Autom atic/by
Application




State Purchase o f  Land 
for Conservation  
Incom e Tax Credit
Year
Started
Alabama Application 3 years o f  tax saving No Yes 1975
Alaska Application 7 years o f  tax saving and 8% interest Yes N o 1967
Arizona Automatic N o Yes N o Before 1974
Arkansas Automatic N o No No 1969
California Application 12.5 % o f market value Yes Income Tax Credit 1965
Colorado Application N o Yes Yes 1967
Connecticut Application 10% conveyance fee in the first year and 1% by the 
10th year
Yes Yes 1963
Delaware Automatic Preceding 10 years o f  tax saving Yes Yes 1968
Florida Application No Yes Yes 1959
Georgia Application 1st or 2nd year: 5 times o f  tax savings 
3 rd or 4th y ea r: 4 times o f  savings 
5th or 6th year: 3 times o f  tax savings 
7th or 8th year: 2 times o f  tax savings
Yes Yes 1978
Hawaii Automatic 10 years o f  tax saving No No 1961
Idaho Automatic 10 years o f  tax saving Yes Income Tax Credit 1971
Illinois Automatic 3 years o f  tax saving and 5% interest Yes Yes 1970
Indiana Automatic 10 years o f  tax saving and 10% interest Yes No 1961
Iowa Automatic No No No 1967
Kansas Automatic No No No 1979
Kentucky Automatic 3 years o f  tax saving No No 1969
Louisiana Application No No No 1978
Maine Application 5 years o f  tax saving, or any lesser number o f  tax years 
starting with the year first classified
Yes N o Income Tax Credit 1970
Maryland Automatic 5% transfer tax i f  20+ acres, 4% if  less No Income Tax Credit 1956
Massachusetts Application Conveyance fee begins in year 1 (10%) and down to 
1% in year 10 (Approved, not implemented 1972)
No Yes 1972
Michigan No Current U se Program Yes Yes
Minnesota Application 3 years o f  tax saving Yes No 1969
M ississippi Application No No Income Tax Credit 1980
State A utom atic/by
Application




State Purchase o f  Land 
for Conservation  
Incom e Tax Credit
Year
Started
Missouri Automatic N o N o No 1967
Montana Application N o Yes No 1973
Nebraska Application 3 years o f  tax saving N o No 1972
Nevada Application 6 years o f  tax saving N o No 1975
New
Hampshire
Application 10 percent o f  the lull and true value N o No 1974
N ew  Jersey Application 3 years o f  tax saving N o No 1963
N ew  M exico Application No No Income-Tax Credit 1971
N ew  York Application 5 years o f  tax saving and 10% interest No Income Tax Credit 1972
North Carolina Application 6 years o f  tax saving No Income Tax credit 1973
North Dakota Application No N o No 1973
Ohio Application 3 years o f  tax saving Yes No 1973
Oklahoma Automatic No No No 1968
Oregon Application 10 years o f  tax saving No Yes 1963
Pennsylvania Application 7 years o f  tax saving and 6% interest Yes No 1966
Rhode Island Application 10% o f  market value for the first 6 years and declines 
to 0% by 15th year
No No 1968
South Carolina Application 5 years o f  tax saving Yes Income Tax Credit 1976
South Dakota Automatic No No No 1966
Tennessee Application 3 years o f  tax saving for open-space and 5 years o f  tax 
saving for forests
Yes No 1976
Texas Application 5 years o f  tax saving and 7% interest No No 1966
Utah Application 5 years o f  tax saving Yes No 1969
Vermont Application 20% o f  market value (10% if  enrolled > 10 years) Yes No 1969
Virginia Application Roll-back: 5 most recent tax years Yes Yes 1970
Washington Application 7 years o f  tax saving and 20% interest; also, 20%  
penalty, unless a two year “Notice to Withdraw” is 
given after 8th year
No No 1968
West Virginia Application 5 years o f  tax saving and 9% interest No No 1977
State Autom atic/by
Application




State Purchase o f  Land 
for Conservation  
Incom e Tax Credit
Year
Started
Wisconsin Application 10% o f  the market value and use value difference : <
10 acres
7.5% o f  the market value and use value difference : 10 
-30 acres





Wyoming Application 7 years o f  tax saving and 18% interest Yes No 1973
Source: http://huntingheritage.org (Multistate Conservation Grant Program), Hady & Sibold (1974)
Table 3.2: State Objectives in Current Use Assessment
State The Intent o f  the C U  Value Assessment Law
Alabam a A llev iate pressure on  landow ners to  convert their agricultural land to other uses.
Arkansas Protect agricultural landow ners from  external in flu en ces that m ight increase the  
value o f  their property out o f  proportion to its in com e potential.
C onnecticut Prevent the forced con version  o f  agricultural lands to m ore in tensive uses.
Florida Low er property taxes on agricultural lands in order to  reduce the pressure on 
farmers to convert agricultural lands to  other uses.
G eorgia Provide a m echanism  to  reduce the pressure on landow ners to convert 
agricultural land to other uses.
Kentucky Prevent the premature con version  o f  farm land to other uses.
M ississipp i Ensure that the farmer is not put in a p osition  in w hich  it w ould  be m ore  
advantageous to se ll the property.
North
Carolina
Provide tax re lie f to bona fid e agricultural landow ners to  prevent premature 
conversion  o f  farm land to  other uses.
Oklahom a Facilitate uniform  ad valorem  tax  assessm en t procedures throughout the state.
Pennsylvania Encourage property ow ners to retain their land in agricultural or forestland use, 
and to provide som e tax  re lie f  to  landow ners.
South
Carolina
Ensure that the assessm en t o f  agricultural land is reasonable and the penalty  
system  is to ensure properties rem ain in agricultural classification .
T ennessee A llev ia te  land con version  pressures placed on agricultural land as a result o f  
urbanization and property taxation.
Texas K eep property from  diverted from  agricultural to other urbanized uses due to  
increasing property tax burden.
W isconsin Provide property tax re lie f  for agricultural landow ners and to  reduce urban 
sprawl.
V irginia Encourage preservation o f  agricultural and open  sp aces w ithin  the reach o f  
concentrated areas o f  population.
Sources: Rodgers and Williams (1983); Legislative Audit Bureau, State o f Wisconsin 
(2010); Connecticut Department o f Revenue Administration ().
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Table 3.3: State Summary Statistics
Variables Unit of Measurement 1949 1997
Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Net Farm Income Dollars per acre 64.97 45.04 6.70 242.06 52.26 48.40 3.27 215.48
Urban Land Percentage of total land 2.01 3.29 0.06 16.49 6.63 8.55 0.16 36.06
Rural Transport Land Percentage of total land 4.79 1.87 1.94 11.84 8.19 6.15 2.63 39.18
Forest Land Percentage of total land 39.58 21.93 1.35 83.99 37.68 22.45 1.00 85.82
Farmland Percentage of total land 6.10 2.19 1.07 9.86 4.21 2.54 0.02 9.43
Property Tax Rev. Percentage of total tax revenue 5.38 5.55 0.00 28.34 1.93 3.97 0.00 17.95
Sales Tax Rev. Percentage of total tax revenue 60.29 14.00 30.13 84.38 48.81 15.81 5.93 85.78
Income Tax Rev. Percentage of total tax revenue 16.59 12.32 0.00 49.74 36.73 16.80 0.00 73.93
Per Capita Income Dollars 5458.2 1149.9 2932.7 7533.6 15278 2137.7 11763 21730
Population Growth Per 1000 111.56 54.72 -37.84 222.01 54.79 48.89 -13.60 259.18
Table 3.4: Cox Regression Results -  Current Use Program Implementation
C o ef Pr(>|z|) ex p (co e f) Std.Err.
Urban Land % 0 .071*
(0 .0 6 1 )
1 .074 0 .0 3 8
Farmland % 0.014*
(0 .0 7 3 )
1 .014 0 .0 0 8
Population Growth 0 .007**
(0 .0 0 4 )
1 .007 0 .0 0 2
Property Tax Revenue% -0 .116*
(0 .0 8 1 )
0 .8 9 0 0 .0 6 7
Rural Trans. Land% 0.0 5 5
(0 .4 7 4 )
1 .057 0 .0 7 7
Per Capita Incom e 5 .6E -05
(0 .6 2 4 )
1 .000 0 .0001
Incom e T ax R evenue% 0.001
(0 .9 0 2 )
1.001 0 .0 1 0
C oncordance C o e ff 0 .7 P :0 .074
L ikelihood  Ratio 16.1 P :0 .0242
W ald Test 16.61 P:0.0201
Score (L og  Rank) Test 17.21 P :0 .0 1 61
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Table 3.5: Cox Regression Results - Imposition of Current Use Withdrawal Penalty




ex p (co ef) Std. Err C o e f
Pr(> |z|)
ex p (co e f) Std.Err
Urban Land % 0.0 3 9
(0 .3 5 7 )
1 .039 0 .0 4 2 0 .0 5 5
(0 .1 9 5 )
1 .057 0 .0 4 3
Farm land % -0 .0 1 2
(0 .2 4 6 )
0 .9 8 8 0 .0 1 0 -0 .1 3 4 * *
(0 .0 0 3 )
1.143 0 .0 4 5
Population Growth 0.001
(0 .8 7 7 )
1.001 0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 0 2
(0 .7 0 5 )
0 .9 9 8 0 .0 0 4
Property T ax  
R evenu e %
-0 .0 3 8
(0 .6 2 6 )
0 .963 0 .0 7 7 -0 .0 7 0
(0 .3 8 0 )
0 .9 3 3 0 .0 7 9
Rural Trans. Land% 0.0 0 7
(0 .9 2 6 )
1 .007 0 .0 7 8 -0 .0 3 3
(0 .6 8 9 )
0 .9 6 8 0 .0 8 3
Per Capita Incom e 0.0001
(0 .4 1 7 )
1.000 0.000 0 .0 0 2 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 )
1 .002 0.001
Incom e Tax  
R evenu e %
0.0 0 8
(0 .5 2 3 )
1.008 0 .0 1 2 -0 .0 0 6
(0 .6 4 6 )
0 .9 9 4 0 .0 1 3
Dummy Variables
M idw est (D um m y) -0.411  
(0 .5 7 8 )
0 .663 0 .7 3 9 -9  4 2 2 * * *  
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.000 2 .7 7 0
W est (D um m y) 0 .0 6 4
(0 .9 1 9 )
1 .066 0 .6 3 0 0 .6 5 7
(0 .3 0 8 )
1 .929 0 .6 4 4
N orth East (D um m y) 0 .2 5 4
(0 .7 1 7 )
1 .289 0 .7 0 2 0 .3 3 5
(0 .6 4 8 )
1 .398 0 .7 3 4
Time-Trend (TT) ,
Farmland % TT -0 .0 2 5 * * *
(0 .0 0 1 )
0 .9 7 5 0 .0 0 7
M idw est R egion  TT 1.495***
(0 .0 0 0 )
4 .461 0 .4 2 0
Per Capita Incom e 
TT
0 .0 0 0 1 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 )
1.000 0.000
C oncordance C o e ff 0 .7 6 4 P :0 .066 0 .791 P :0 .066
L ikelihood  Ratio 18.24 P:0.051 3 2 .1 7 P :0 .002
W ald T est ^ 19 .92 P:0.031 37.81 P :0 .000
Score (L o g  Rank) 
Test
2 3 .9 8 P :0 .007 3 7 .6 2 P :0 .000
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Table 3.6: Regression Diagnostics - Proportional Hazard Assumption







Urban Land % -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .9 6 0 -0 .0 9 6 0 .4 0 0 0 .5 2 7
Farmland % -0 .1 0 2 0 .6 1 5 0 .4 3 3 -0 .3 7 1 * * 4 .9 7 0 0 .0 2 6
Population Growth -0 .023 0 .0 1 9 0 .8 8 9 0 .1 6 0 0 .6 9 9 0 .4 0 3
Property T ax R ev. % -0 .0 3 0 0 .0 4 7 0 .8 2 8 -0 .0 7 8 0 .2 0 8 0 .6 4 8
Rural Trans. Land% 0.0 0 5 0 .0 0 2 0 .9 6 9 0 .2 1 7 1 .910 0 .1 6 7
Per Capita Incom e -0 .0 4 6 0 .1 0 0 0 .7 5 2 -0 .3 0 * * * 8 .1 5 0 0 .0 0 4
Incom e T ax Rev. % -0 .1 6 6 1.371 0 .2 4 2 0 .0 6 0 0 .1 4 9 0 .7 0 0
Dummy Variables
M idw est (D u m m y) 0 .3 0 0 * * 6 .4 3 0 0 .011
W est (D um m y) -0 .0 0 4 0.001 0 .9 7 8
N orth East (D um m y) 0.171 1 .640 0 .2 0 0
Global N A 2 .6 4 9 0 .9 1 5 N A 15.400 0 .1 1 7
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Table 3.7: Classification of Current Use Withdrawal Penalties
Penalty C ategory D escription
CO N o  CU w ithdraw al penalty
C l Market va lu e penalty -  F ixed  rate
C2 Market value penalty -  D ec lin in g  rate
C3 R oll-back  penalty -  F ixed  rate
C 4 R oll-back  penalty fixed  rate w ith  additional interest
C5 R oll-back  penalty -  D ec lin in g  rate
C l' Market value penalty -  F ixed  rate +  D ec lin in g  rate (C 1+ C 2)
C2' =  C3 R oll-back  penalty -  F ixed  rate
C3' =  C 4 R oll-back  penalty w ith additional interest
O -t^ II n R oll-back  penalty -  D ec lin in g  rate
c i "  = c r Market va lu e penalty -  F ixed  rate +  D ec lin in g  rate (C 1+ C 2)
C2" R oll-back  penalty -  F ixed  rate +  D ec lin in g  rate (C3 + C 5)
C3'' =  C4 R oll-back  penalty w ith additional interest
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Table 3.8: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Regression Log-odds Ratios of
Penalty Determination
Variables Market 
V alue ( C l )
M arket 
V alu e  
S lid in g  
S ca le  (C 2)
R oll-back  
Penalty (C 3)
R oll-back  
w ith  Interest 
(C 4)
R oll-back
D ec lin in g
(C 5 )
Urban land % 0 .9 5 9
(0 .6 8 2 )
3 .3 0 3 * *
(0 .0 0 3 )
0 .9 5 2
(0 .6 1 3 )
0 .751**
(0 .0 1 9 )
1 .212
(0 .2 5 9 )
Farmland % 3.8E -7**
(0 .0 0 0 )
1.9E -8*'
(0 .0 4 0 )
2 .88 E -6 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 )
7 .0E -6***
(0 .0 0 0 )
1 .3E -7***
(0 .0 0 0 )
Property tax % 0 .8 3 6
(0 .3 1 2 )
0 .0 0 0 * *
(0 .0 0 8 )
0 .6 7 7 *
(0 .0 2 9 )
0 .823
(0 .2 4 3 )
. 0 .2 8 2  
(0 .1 1 8 )
Incom e tax  % 1.102**
(0 .0 0 3 )
1 .176
(0 .0 3 4 )
1 .081**
(0 .0 0 9 )
1 .005
(0 .8 6 8 )
1 .134**
(0 .0 0 8 )
Population growth 0 .9 8 2
(0 .0 8 2 )
0 .9 3 0
(0 .0 9 3 )
0 .9 7 9 *
(0 .0 3 1 )
0 .9 5 4 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 )
1 .004
(0 .8 3 4 )
Rural transport, land 
%
1.319
(0 .1 2 7 )
0 .1 0 5 *
(0 .0 3 6 )
1 .339
(0 .0 9 6 )
1 .416
(0 .0 5 2 )
0 .5 9 2
< 0 .223 )
Per capita incom e 1.003***
(0 .0 0 0 )
1 .002**
(0 .0 0 6 )
1 .003***
(0 .0 0 0 )
1 .004***
(0 .0 0 0 )
1 .003***
(0 .0 0 0 )
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Table 3.9: Penalty Category Combination Test
Test Chi2(Prob) Combine or Not
C1=C0 32.3 (0.000) No
C2=C0 20.84 (0.004) No
C3=C0 31.63 (0.000) No
C4=C0 35.44 (0.000) No
C5=C0 28.52 (0.000) No
C1=C2 11.93 (0.103) Yes
C3=C4 38.83 (0.000) No
C3=C5 7.56 (0.0373) No
C4=C5 23.48 (0.001) .No
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Table 3.10: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Regression Log-odds Ratios of






















































































Table 3.11: Penalty Category Combination Test -  5 Categories
Test C hi2(Prob) C om b in e or N ot
C1'=C0 37 .2 4  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
C 2 - C 0 32 .0 7  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
C 3 - C 0 36 .9 0  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
o If o o 2 9 .8 5  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
C 1 -C 2 ' 32 .4  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
C 1 -C 3 ' 4 5 .6 2  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
C 1 -C 4 ' 8 .45  (0 .2 9 4 ) Y es
C2 —C3' 3 7 .3 9  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
C 2 -C 4 ' 7.21 (0 .4 0 7 ) Y es
C 3 -C 4 ' 2 3 .4 2  (0 .0 0 0 ) N o
Combined C2' and C4', not C l ' and C4' penalty categories
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Table 3.12: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Regression Log-odds Ratios of










































































Table 3.13: Penalty Category Combination Test -  4 Categories
Test Chi2(Prob) Combine or Not
C1"=C0 37.14(0.000) No
C2"=C0 32.29 (0.000) No
C3"=C0 37.04 (0.000) No
C1"=C2" 32.75 (0.000) No
C1”=C3" 45.36 (0.000) No
C2"=C3" 38.55 (0.000) No
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Table 3.14: Cause-specific Cox Regression Results








ex p (co e f) C o e f
P r(> |z|)
ex p (co e f) C o e f
Pr(> |z|)
ex p (co e f)
Urban Land % 0.109*
(0 .0 8 6 )
1 .115 0 .0 9 6
(0 .2 4 1 )
1 .100 -0 .0 9 9
(0 .5 4 1 )
0 .9 0 6
Farmland % 0 .0 0 7
(0 .8 5 9 )
1 .007 -0 .021
(0 .2 9 4 )
0 .9 7 9 0 .003
(0 .9 0 1 )
1.003
Population Growth 0 .0 0 9
(0 .2 0 5 )
1 .009 0 .0 0 4
(0 .4 9 2 )
1 .004 -0.011
(0 .3 0 8 )
0 .9 8 9
Property T ax  R evenue  
%
0 .2 0 2
(0 .5 2 0 )
1.224 -0 .071
(0 .6 2 7 )
0 .931 0 .0 1 7
(0 .9 3 4 )
1 .017
Rural Trans. Land% . 0 .1 0 6
(0 .6 2 1 )
1.111 0 .2 3 6
(0 .1 0 6 )
1 .266 0 .2 3 4
(0 .2 0 9 )
1 .264
Per Capita Income -0.001
(0 .1 3 2 )
0 .9 9 9 -0 .001**
(0 .0 0 2 )
0 .9 9 9 0 .0 0 0
(0 .9 8 6 )
1 .000
Incom e T ax R evenue  
%
0 .0 4 7
(0 .1 8 9 )
1 .048 0 .0 3 2
(0 .1 5 7 )
1 .032 -0 .041
(0 .1 1 1 )
0 .9 6 0
Dummy Variables
M idw est (D um m y) -1 6 .6 8 0
(0 .8 4 2 )
0 .0 0 0 2 .220*
(0 .0 6 8 )
9 .2 0 5 0 .3 1 2
(0 .8 4 2 )
1 .366
W est (D um m y) 0 .1 0 9
(0 .0 7 6 )
1.115 0 .6 3 6
(0 .5 2 0 )
1 .889 0 .4 4 8
(0 .8 1 4 )
1 .564
North East (D um m y) 3 .1 4 0
(0 .9 9 8 )
2 3 .1 0 0 -0 .5 5 5
(0 .6 8 0 )
0 .5 7 4 1 .207
(0 .3 7 1 )
3 .343
C oncordance C o e ff 0 .883  
S E  0 .1 1 9
0 .8 0 9  
SE  0 .09
0 .755  
SE  0.11
L ikelihood Ratio 18.34
(0 .0 4 9 )
15.25
(0 .1 2 3 )
8 .2 9
(0 .6 0 0 )
W ald Test 9.5
(0 .4 8 5 )
14 .04
(0 .1 7 1 )
8 .25
(0 .6 0 4 )
Score (L o g  Rank) Test 26 .6 8
(0 .0 0 2 )
16.61
(0 .0 8 3 )
10.3
(0 .4 1 5 )
RSquare 0 .3 1 2 0 .2 6 7 0 .1 5 6
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Table 3.15: Fine and Gray Competing Risk Regression Results
'








ex p (co e f) C o e f
Pr(> |z |)
ex p (co e f) C o e f
Pr(> |z|)
ex p (co e f)
Urban Land % 0.0 4 7
(0 .300 )
1 .048 0 .0 5 7
(0 .5 9 0 )
1 .058 -0 .1 4 5 * *
(0 .0 4 6 )
0 .8 6 5
Farmland % -0 .0 1 9
(0 .380 )
0 .981 -0 .0 2 4
(0 .2 2 0 )
0 .9 7 6 -0 .0 0 2
(0 .9 5 0 )
0 .9 9 8
Population Growth 0.008*
(0 .096 )
1 .009 -0 .0 0 2
(0 .5 9 0 )
0 .9 9 8 -0 .0 1 2
(0 .3 3 0 )
0 .9 8 8




1 .156 -0 .0 3 3
(0 .8 1 0 )
0 .9 6 7 0 .0 3 2
(0 .8 9 0 )
1.033
Rural Trans. Land% -0 .0 0 7
(0 .960 )
0 .9 9 3 0 .1 1 0
(0 .3 5 0 )
1 .116 0 .1 8 2
(0 .3 5 0 )
1.199
Per Capita Incom e 0.000
(0 .900 )
1.000 0.000
(0 .1 3 0 )
1.000 0.000
(0 .4 8 0 )
1.000




1 .040 0 .0 2 7
(0 .2 4 0 )
1 .028 -0 .042**
(0 .0 3 4 )
0 .9 5 8
Dummy Variables
M idw est (D um m y) 1.690
(0 .160 )
5 .441 0 .5 4 4
(0 .5 6 0 )
1.723 -0 .3 9 8
(0 .8 4 0 )
0 .6 7 2
W est (D um m y) -0 .0 2 5
(0 .9 7 0 )
0 .9 7 6 -0 .4 4 7
(0 .8 3 0 )
0 .6 4 0
North E ast (D um m y) 2 .2 2 0
(0 .0 3 4 )
9 .2 0 4 -1 .8 3 2
(0 .2 0 0 )
0 .1 6 0 0 .5 7 6
(0 .5 3 0 )
1 .778
Pseudo L og-lik elihood -2 3 .7 -63.1 -2 9 .9
Pseudo lik elihood  ratio 
test
13.8 8 .44 9 .1 6
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Figure 3.1: Preferential Current Use Taxation Versus Deferred Taxation States
Preferential Taxation 
Deferred Taxation 0 21S 430 360 1,290 1,720■Miles
101
Figure 3.2: Current Use Withdrawal Penalty Categories
Preferential CU Program (N aC U  Penalty) 
Market Value Penalty (Fixed R ate)
Market Value Penalty (Declining R ate) 
Roll-back Penalty  (Fixed Rate)
 I Roll-back Penalty with Added Interest Rate
Roll-back Penalty  (Declining R ate) 0 215 430 860 1.290 1.720 ■Miles
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Figure 3.3: Current Use Program with Restrictive Agreements on Agricultural 
Land
No Restrictive Agreements 
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C h a p t e r  4
4 Ev aluatio n  of E ffe c tiv e n ess  o f  C u rrent  U se  P r o pe r t y  T ax  Pr o g r a m s
4.1 Introduction
Current use (CU) taxation focuses on providing property tax relief to landowners 
with agricultural, forestry or even sometimes with open-space undeveloped land. 
Previous research, including the findings from chapter 2, shows that receiving a 
considerable property tax relief has been one o f the major determinants o f enrolling land 
in the CU program. Although not directly stated, legislators believed that the provided 
property tax relief might discourage conversion o f land to urbanized uses such as 
residential and commercial development. The CU program’s effectiveness in 
discouraging conversion o f land has been widely discussed over the years. Some specific 
features o f the CU program may help to delay the conversion o f  land. The features that 
could delay the conversion are restrictions on conversion and CU withdrawal penalties.
The first CU program feature focused on in this chapter is CU withdrawal 
penalties. Based on CU withdrawal penalty structures, CU programs can be broadly 
categorized into two approaches: preferential assessment and deferred taxation. Under the 
preferential assessment approach, lands qualified for CU programs are assessed at value 
in use, and the owner will not pay any penalty in case o f  withdrawal from the program for 
developed uses. In the deferred taxation approach, a tax recapture penalty is imposed 
when the land is withdrawn from the program. Those penalties may discourage
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withdrawal o f enrolled land from the program and may make short-term CU enrollment 
costly for the landowner. A detailed description o f states’ CU programs was given in 
chapter 3.
While stricter CU penalties upon withdrawal may reduce the rate o f conversion 
of CU land to developed uses, how precisely those penalties are designed matters. For 
example, England and Mohr (2003) advocate stricter penalties that decline with the 
length o f enrollment of parcels in the program. That is, if a land is enrolled for a longer 
period, penalties on withdrawal will be lessened as opposed to early withdrawal. This is 
an important theoretical suggestion that needs empirical verification. Based on their 
model, I hypothesize that the states with rising CU withdrawal penalties experience 
higher rates in land development, compared to the states with declining penalties over 
time. This chapter focuses on understanding whether features o f CU penalties lead to 
differences in land development in the U.S. I use a simulated database consisting of 
penalties across the U.S. to understand the effect o f penalties on land development.
The second CU program feature considered in this chapter is the presence of 
restrictive agreements (Collins, 1976; Hady & Sibold, 1974; Keene, 1976; Rodgers & 
G.H.Williams, 1983) on enrollment in the program, considered the third category of the 
CU program. The states with restrictive agreements are Hawaii, California, Washington, 
New York, Maine, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Florida. Restrictive agreements obligate 
the landowners to refrain from developing the land for urban uses for a certain number of 
years. A detailed description on restrictive agreements was provided in chapter 3. 
Considering the effect o f restrictive agreements, I hypothesize, that states with restrictive
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agreements on land development experience lower rates o f  land development over the 
years.
Unavailability o f state level CU information is a drawback in this study to 
compare the influence o f CU acres on development across states. Therefore, this chapter 
first focuses on the simulated data developed using available information related to the 
CU program. Using the simulated data, my first objective o f  this study is to verify 
whether higher penalties and rising penalties over time lead to different rates o f land 
development across states for the years 1987-2007. Along with CU withdrawal penalties, 
restrictive agreements used by some states may delay the rate o f land development. 
Therefore the second objective o f this chapter is to find out whether restrictive 
agreements o f some CU programs lead to differences in land development.
In contrast to the unavailability o f state level CU data, the New Hampshire CU 
program maintains a comprehensive database about the program. Therefore, the New 
Hampshire CU program’s statistics for the years 1999-2011, along with residential permit 
issue information, are used to test whether residential development has slowed down over 
the years due to enrollment o f land in the CU program. The hypothesis is that towns with 
a higher percentage o f CU land have lower rates in residential land development. The 
number o f new residential permits issued during the period o f study is used as a proxy for 
residential development in New Hampshire. The third objective o f  this chapter is to find 
whether the CU program has had any influence on residential development in New 
Hampshire.
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4.2. Theoretical Background of Current Use Withdrawal Penalty
The studies that focus on CU taxation programs span from theoretical models to 
empirical studies. It is generally agreed that such programs give substantial tax relief to 
participating landowners and as a result reduce the rates o f  land conversion for more 
urbanized uses (Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Griffing, 2000; Polyakov & Zhang, 2008). 
However, there are studies that actually show evidence that casts doubts about the 
success o f the programs (Parks & Quimio, 1996; William, R.Gottfried, Brockett, & 
Evans, 2004). Theoretical models about this preferential taxation program have focused 
on different determinants affecting enrollment in the program and the timing o f 
development. The model developed by England and Mohr (2003) especially focuses on 
withdrawal penalties for lands enrolled in the CU program.
■ According to the model, a landowner decides the timing o f development (D ), 
considering the pecuniary benefits before/after the development (c and u) and non- 
pecuniary benefits (n) only before the development. Therefore, the owner chooses a time 
to develop the land when the present value o f her income stream is maximized. In the 
model the landowner maximizes:
r D[c(t) + n{t)-TA{t)]e~r'dt -  P(D)e~rD + ['="[w(/) -  ryf(/)]e rV/ (4.1)
J / = 0  \. j  < * 1 ~ D
Present value o f  returns Present value Present value o f
to undeveloped °J P f natty returns to developed
land, net o f  taxes on withdrawal land, net o f  taxes
In the above, t  is the property tax rate, r is the owner’s discount rate, P is penalty 
fee and t denotes time. According to program specifications, most o f the states assess 
undeveloped land by capitalizing the pecuniary income, while other states assess
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undeveloped parcels based on some fraction o f market value o f land. This model 
considers undeveloped land value based on land’s capitalized income. Accordingly, the 
assessed value o f an undeveloped land parcel is (if it remains undeveloped): A (t)
= c ( t > ~ r(t ~ ^ d f .  The assessed value o f a developed land parcel can be written: A
(t) = f*_™ u(t')e~r(t ~tf f t  ( fo r t  >  D). Also, the model assumes constant c and n  of 
undeveloped land, whereas the pecuniary benefits o f developed land grow at the rate o f g  
and therefore, u{t) = uegl. In addition, the authors assume, initial u> c and a positive 
non-confiscatory property tax rate (x). That is, the tax burden never exceeds the pecuniary 
return to land. Hence, 0 < x < r-g <7. By substituting the above assumptions to equation 
1, landowner’s solution can be derived as:
((1 - L ) c + n) -  P \D ) + rP(D) = ((1- — L — fre*0) (4.2)
T ;— t ------ ' Effect o f  Value o f  '------------------- '
Instantaneous penalty delavine Instantaneous return
return from  changing penalty from  developed
undeveloped land
land
After solving the above equation the model confirms that a landowner pays 
attention to the P (penalty) as well as c(change in penalty over time) in determining the 
time of development (D). Accordingly, if a landowner delays development of her land, 
she gains rP(D), where the importance o f larger penalties is emphasized. If penalties 
decline over time, then P (D) will be less than zero P  (D) < 0 . That is, a penalty that 
decreases over time encourages a landowner to keep land enrolled in the program to 
enjoy lower penalties in the future. Hence, the benefit o f delaying land development 
increases if penalties decrease with the length o f enrollment. Therefore, England and
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Mohr (2003) advocate stricter penalties that decline over time as the optimal kind o f 
penalty to slower land development.
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Data: This paper relies on several data sources. Land data are from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) and National Resource Inventory (NRI) o f Natural Resource 
Conservation Service. Developed land data are from NRI for the period 1982-2007 (US 
Department o f Agriculture, 2009). Land used for agricultural purposes (crop land, forest 
land), urban areas, and total land areas are from the USDA for the years 1987, 1992, 
1997, 2002 and 2007. Agricultural land values and net farm income data for the years are 
from the Economic Research Service (ERS) o f USDA. Population statistics are from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. The data source for state level property tax revenue and income tax 
revenue is the Local Tax Collection Data of U.S. Census. Tax burden data and the 
average property tax rate in 2000 are from the Tax Foundation. Data on the assessed 
value ratio of properties is collected from the Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy. State level 
CU program data are from Hady & Sibold (1974) and the Hunting Heritage o f the 
Multistate Conservation Grant Program (Hady & Sibold, 1974).
Data used for the case study in New Hampshire are from the New Hampshire 
Department of Revenue Administration (NHDRA). The Department o f Commerce of the 
U.S. Census Bureau is used as the source to obtain statistics on residential permits issued 
for new privately owned residential housing in New Hampshire. The data sources used 
for different variables is summarized in table 4.1.
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Property Tax Rate Simulations: The variation in property tax rates among states, 
counties and towns makes it difficult to do a property tax rate comparison. Therefore, a 
property tax rate simulation was performed for further analysis. I obtained tax burden 
compared to per capita income, as reported in Tax Foundation Data, for all the states 
from 1982-2007. The property tax rate in 2000 was obtained from official records o f each 
state’s revenue department.
A sample o f property tax simulation done using New Hampshire data in the year 
2001 is described below. According to the Tax Foundation12, the property tax burden per 
capita income ratio in New Hampshire was 7.3. The property tax rate in New Hampshire 
in 2000 was 19.9 for $1000 of assessed value of properties. Based on the tax burden per 
capita and the property tax rate in the year 2000 , 1 calculated the tax burden to property 
tax ratio in the year 2000.
_________ Property Tax Rate2000__________   19.9 _
Property Tax Burden per Capita Income2000 7.3
The ratio 2.73 was used to simulate property tax rates from 1982-2007. For 
example, the property tax burden to per capita income was 7.6 and the property tax rate in 
year 2001 was calculated as follows:
Property Tax Rate2m = Property Tax Burden per Capita Income2m *2.73
Property Tax Rate2m = 7.6* 2.73 = 20.75
Similar calculations were done for all the states for the years 1982-2007. The 
above tax simulations were done due to the unavailability o f  full value property tax rates
12 http://taxfoundation.org/arl.icle/state-and-local-tax-burdens-all-vears-one-state-1977-2010
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at the state level. With a simulation study, the reliability o f  data used in the research 
could be challenged. In order to compare the reliability o f  the tax simulation study, I 
compared my simulated property tax data to actual property tax rate data from New 
Hampshire for the years 1995-2009 (see figure 4.1). If  more property tax data were 
available, the above comparison could have been done for more states to check the 
accuracy o f the simulated data. Table 4.2 summarizes the property tax burden 
information and simulated property tax rates across states.
I continued my analysis using the above simulation o f state averages o f property 
tax rates. However, the above property tax rate simulation could add some bias to my 
study. As shown in figure 4.1, property tax burden per capita income has been constant 
over the years (7.3-9.4), which suggests that property tax rates have been adjusted 
according to market conditions. For example, property tax rates have been low during 
economic downturns and have gone up during economic booms, which has led to fewer 
variations in property tax burden compared to per capita income. Therefore, using 
property tax burden data might add some bias in property tax simulations.
CU Value Calculation: Although the market value o f a property is considered as 
the standard value o f assessment for property tax purposes, some states do not consider 
the frill value o f the property in tax calculations. Rather, such states use an assessment 
ratio or a partial assessed value based on the class o f the property when property taxes are 
calculated. Assessment ratios for this paper are from the Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy. 
For the state level analysis, the amount o f property tax charged was calculated by
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multiplying the simulated property tax rates and assessed value o f  agricultural land for 
the years 1987-2007. In order to calculate property tax savings when enrolling a land 
parcel in a CU program, property taxes based on CU value is required. To compute 
capitalization rates by states, I considered the state level average rent13-to-land value ratio 
(England, 2011) over the period 1987-2007. The value o f agricultural land, like other 
income producing assets, can be derived from the expected flow of income. Using per 
acre net farm income and the above simulated capitalization rates, use values are
, , , „ „ Net Income from Agriculture , -Tcalculated as follows: ------------------------- 2------------ . Then the CU property taxes on an
Capitalization Rate
acre of agricultural land were calculated for all the states.
CU Penalty Calculation: Assuming a land was initially enrolled in 1987, I 
calculated the tax savings a landowner receives by enrolling an acre o f  land in the CU 
program and penalties in case o f withdrawal for all 30 states for the years 1987-2007. 
Calculations done for an acre o f land in California and Georgia are shown in table 4.3. 
As shown, the average value o f an acre o f agricultural land in California has increased 
from $1,550 to $5,960 over the years. In California, taxes are applied to 100% of the 
market value. Therefore, if land is not enrolled in the CU program, the assessed value for 
tax purposes is the same as the market value o f  land. Property tax savings from enrolling 
an acre o f land in a CU program are about $106 in 1987 and $444 in 2007. However, if a 
landowner in California decides to withdraw the land from CU designation, a CU 
withdrawal penalty is applied. In California, the CU penalty is 12.5% of the market value
13 Rents are generally considered a short run indicator o f  the return to a landowner’s investment in the land
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at the time of withdrawal. Therefore, if an acre of land is withdrawn, the penalty in the 
first year would be $194 per acre, whereas the penalty would be $745 in 2007. According 
to this calculation, a landowner with CU designated land in California may face a 
withdrawal penalty despite the length o f the enrollment. In contrast, a landowner in 
Georgia will face declining penalties (see table 4.3). Similar calculations were done for 
all the states used for this analysis. Above penalty calculations are used for further 
analysis o f this chapter.
Internal Rate of Return flRR) Calculation: According to Berry (1993), IRR of the 
CU program compares the abated taxes per acre and the taxes paid per acre following 
withdrawal (Berry, 1993). The IRR. calculation formula can be given as:
+ = 0 (4.3)
+■'(1 +  0  (1 +  0
where, TA is the amount o f abated taxes, LUC is the land use change tax (i.e. CU 
withdrawal penalty) and n goes from 0 years to X years. The IRR signifies the degree to 
which the withdrawal penalty offsets the abated property taxes resulting from enrollment 
in the program. For example, a zero IRR means that the penalty completely offsets the 
abated taxes with no net gain to either the property owner or the town. An IRR greater 
than zero means that the penalty was larger than the tax savings incurred, so there is net 
gain to the town. If it is negative, then the penalty is not large enough to offset the tax 
savings, and, therefore, the landowner receives a financial gain by enrolling the land. 
This paper includes a dummy variable (D =l) if a landowner gains by enrolling a land, i.e. 
if IRR is negative.
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Empirical Models Used in Analyses: In determining the factors that could lead to 
land development across the states, I estimate the following model:
(4.4)
In equation 4.4, Yu represents percentage rise in developed land compared to state’s land 
total. In equation (4.4), X%u is a vector o f time dependent variables that are related to
the CU program. The variables considered are calculated CU penalties, property tax 
savings, severity o f penalty (compared to market value o f land) and IRR.
As discussed in chapter 3, I classified CU withdrawal penalties into six major 
categories. However, within each penalty category, states’ CU penalty can differ 
depending on the number o f years o f recapture penalty and in the percentage charged as 
market-value penalty etc. The differences in market value and CU value across states also 
vary. Therefore a landowner in a state with a higher difference between CU value and 
market value will be paying a higher roll-back penalty compared to a landowner in a state 
with a lower difference between CU value and market value, even when the number of 
years of recapture is the same. To introduce the differences in severity o f CU penalty, I 
used a categorical variable -  severity o f penalty. The ranking o f the severity o f penalties 
depends on the ratio of penalty to accumulated tax savings. Depending on the above ratio, 
I categorized severity o f penalties into six groups. The severity ratio 0 is given for states 
with no CU penalty. Other penalty severity categories are >0-25, >25-50, > 50-75, >75- 
100 and > 100.
The vector X ''and includes several land characteristics relevant in predicting the 
rate of land development. The variables are percentage o f federal land, percentage of
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developed land in the previous year and the percentage o f rural transportation land. The 
vector X f sricu includes farm dependency index (FDI) 14 and agricultural land value per 
acre. The vector X f her includes three dummy variables to introduce other land 
conservation programs, including conservation reserve program (CRP), conservation 
easement and income tax credit program on land conservation. x f ° ceco includes
population change over the period o f analysis. In estimating equation 4.4, I used data 
from 46 states for the years 1987-2007. Michigan, Alaska, Hawaii and Wisconsin are not 
included in the analysis. Michigan was excluded from the analysis because there is no 
CU program in the state. Alaska and Hawaii were not included due to some missing 
information. Wisconsin is also not included since the CU law in Wisconsin was not 
enacted until 1995, although the law was passed in 1974. Random effect panel data 
regression was used to estimate equation 4.4.
In determining whether states with penalties increasing over time have any 
differences in the amount of land development compared to the states with declining or 
constant penalties, I estimate the following model:
Yil= f ( X ^ u' , X f u ,X lf,nd, X ^ r'cu,X f),her,X floceco) + s il (4.5)
Compared to equation 4.4, equation 4.5 includes a dummy variable ( X f u ) to 
indicate CU penalties that have risen compared to the previous year. In equation 4.5, 
Xf:u includes CU property tax savings and internal rate o f returns (IRR). All other 
variables in 4.5 are the same as described in equation 4.4. In estimating 4 .5 ,1 used all the 
30 states with any sort o f a CU withdrawal penalty. Wisconsin is the only state with a CU
14 FDI;,= Agricultural income/Total income
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withdrawal penalty that was omitted in estimating equation 4.5. A random effect panel 
data regression was used to estimate equation 4.5.
In determining whether rates o f  residential development are influenced by the 
amount of CU acres in New Hampshire, I estimate the following model:
Y„ (4.6)
In equation 4.6, Y„ represents the number o f residential permits issued by each town 
in New Hampshire. In equation 4.6, Xftu is a vector o f  time dependent CU 
characteristics. The variables related to the CU program are percentage o f CU land 
enrolled and CU penalties per acre, if land is withdrawn. x f oao~ecm is a vector containing 
population change (per 1,000) in each year and average annual daily traffic data (AADT). 
The vector X f ‘BD contains two dummy variables introducing towns located within 50 
miles from Boston, MA and Manchester, NH. In estimating equation 4.6, I used town 
level data from 231 New Hampshire towns for the years 1999-2011. Equation 4.6 was 
estimated using random effect panel data technique.
4.4 Results and Discussion
This section presents the results from two studies carried out for this chapter. First, 
I present the descriptive statistics for the state level comparison study on land 
development rates. Then, I present the random effect regression analysis results of the 




Detailed summary statistics for the years 1987 and 2007 are shown in tables 4.4 and 
4.5. As shown, the mean FDI has declined from 2.39 in 1987 to 1.15 by the year 2007, 
indicating a proportional reduction o f farm income compared to total income in a state. 
Similarly, the percentage of cropland has decreased to 21 percent in 2007, compared to 
25 percent in 1987. In contrast, the percentage o f urban land has increased to 7 percent, 
compared to 5.7 percent in 1987.
Figure 4.2 shows the changes in severity o f  penalty during the years 1987-2007. As 
shown, in most o f the states the severity o f  penalty has declined over the years. This 
decline in severity o f penalty is mostly observed in states with roll-back penalties. Figure 
4.3 and table 4.6 show the number o f residential building permits issued by counties in 
New Hampshire from 1999-2011. As shown, the counties Hillsborough, Rockingham and 
Strafford have issued a higher number o f permits during the period o f study. Starting in 
2006, the average number o f residential permits issued by a town has declined 
irrespective o f the county, reaching an annual average number o f permits issued to 10 or 
below. This sharp decline in the number o f residential permits issued can be explained by 
the 2007 Great Recession experienced by the U.S. economy.
Results o f the three random effect panel data regressions (equations 4.4-4.6) are 
presented in the next section.
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4.4.2 Random Effect Panel Data Regression Results
The first objective o f this paper is to find the influence o f  withdrawal penalties on 
the rate o f land development across states. The estimations obtained for the analyses are 
presented in table 4.7. In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of land 
developed compared to the total land in the state. The difference between models 1 and 2 
is that in model 1 CU penalties are used as an independent variable; in contrast, model 2 
uses a dummy variable to represent the states with penalties that rise over time.
As expected, an increase in CU property tax savings results in significantly lower 
rates o f land development (see models 1 and 2). Also the results suggest that states with a 
higher proportion o f federal land have lower rates in land development. As shown in 
table 4.7, states that are heavily dependent on agricultural income compared to their total 
income have lower rates in land development (not significant). As expected, states with a 
conservation reserve program (CRP) have lower rates in land development. The results 
. also suggest, if a state imposes conservation restrictions upon CU enrollment, such states 
will have lower rates in land development (see table 4.7). As expected, an increase in 
population results in a significant increase in land developed in a state (model 1).
I hypothesized that CU penalties discourage land development, but rising 
penalties may encourage farmers to withdraw land from the program for development 
purposes. As shown in the results o f model 1, states with CU penalties have lower rates 
o f land development. However, the effect is highly insignificant. Results from model 2 do 
not support my hypothesis, the states with rising penalties experience faster development 
compared to the states with declining penalties. This rise in CU withdrawal penalties 
could be mainly attributed to a rise in market value o f land. Penalties that are based on
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market value o f land at the time o f sale are affected by a rise in market value. Penalties 
that are based on tax savings are influenced by a rising market value, because landowners 
receive an increase in tax savings by enrolling land.
This chapter also focuses on finding out whether the CU program in New 
Hampshire has influenced residential development. As suggested by Berry (1993), most 
of the land withdrawn from the CU program in New Hampshire has been withdrawn for 
residential development. I extended her analysis for all the towns in New Hampshire. The 
results o f the residential development analysis are shown in table 4.8. The dependent 
variable for this analysis is the average number o f residential permits issued by a town in 
an year. As expected, an increase in CU land in a town has resulted in a significant 
decrease in residential permits issued in a year. The results also suggest an increase in 
property tax savings results in a decline in number o f residential permits issued. Also the 
results indicate higher residential development in towns located within 50 miles o f 
Boston and Manchester. As expected, an increase in population also results in an increase 
in residential land development.
4.5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
CU programs have been implemented in the U.S. to provide substantial tax relief to 
agricultural and forestry landowners. In some states, the landowners with open space land 
do qualify to receive CU property tax savings. As discussed in chapter 2, the tax relief 
landowners receive by enrolling land plays a major role in the amount o f land enrolled in 
the CU program. In addition, it is important to explore whether the tax relief received
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indirectly results in lowering the conversion o f undeveloped land to developed uses. 
Existing literature about the CU program suggests that the program might be helpful in 
preventing property tax driven development, resulting in lowering the rates o f land 
development. However, no empirical studies relating land development and the CU 
program are found in the existing literature (to my knowledge). Therefore, this chapter 
focused on addressing the land development issue focusing on the CU program.
The factors emphasized in this chapter are the percentage of land enrolled in the 
CU program, the penalties imposed if land is withdrawn from the program and whether 
CU withdrawal penalties are rising, declining or constant within the length o f the enrolled 
period. I used two sets o f data to analyze whether the CU program helps to reduce the 
rates of land development. The first dataset consists o f state level information on the CU 
program. Finding detailed state level information on CU programs was difficult and 
therefore, with the information that was available, I simulated data on CU penalties and 
CU savings for further analysis. The simulated dataset is used to understand the influence 
of CU penalties on state level land development for the period 1987-2007. The second 
dataset consists of residential land development data from New Hampshire for the years 
1999-2011. I used the average number o f new residential permits issued by towns as a 
proxy in land development in New Hampshire.
In contrast to my hypothesis, results suggest that there is no significant effect of 
CU penalties on the rates of land development across states. It is possible that some o f the
independent variables of Xftu in equation 4.4 and equation 4.5 suffer from possible
endogeneity issues. Variables in a regression can be endogenous for several reasons.
Simultaneity (i.e. reverse causation), measurement error and omitted variable bias, are the
123
leading causes o f endogeneity (Verbeek, 2008). The two main variables I am interested in 
in this research could be a perfect example o f  endogeneity due to reverse causation. It is 
not clear how states did assign different withdrawal penalties or at least why some states 
impose CU penalties upon withdrawal, while some states do not impose a penalty. States 
with high land development potential could lean towards the imposition o f a stricter 
penalty, which, on the other hand, states with increasing penalties could have higher rates 
of development. This possibility o f reverse causation between the percentage rise in 
developed land compared to state’s land total and CU penalties, could lead to inconsistent 
and biased linear estimates. An instrumental variable approach would be appropriate in 
case of reverse causation that I suspect in equations 4.4. and 4.5.
As indicated by IRR, if landowners do not get a financial advantage by enrolling 
in the program (i.e. if penalties are greater than tax savings received by enrolling land), 
rates of land development in such states are higher (see model 2). Also, the results 
suggest that the percentage of federal land and the presence o f other conservation 
programs such as the conservation reserve program (CRP) help to lower the rates of land 
development in the U.S.
The analysis done using residential development information from New 
Hampshire, suggests that CU savings per acre and amount o f CU land in a town influence 
the residential development in the state. According to the results, an increase in CU land 
leads to lower issuance of residential permits and, therefore, a slower increase in 
residential development too. In this essay, I chose only New Hampshire residential 
development data to study the influence o f a CU program on residential land 
development. Using only one state’s data leads to some limitations due to lack o f
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variation in residential development patterns. Using more states to compare residential 
development with CU programs would provide more insight into CU program features on 
residential land development across states.
The analyses of this chapter were performed with a great constraint in availability 
o f property tax rates and CU data for all the states. Therefore, I simulated a dataset for 
further analyses across states to find out whether CU programs influence the reduction of 
the rates o f  land development. The property tax rates that were simulated using property 
tax burden per capita and year 2000 actual property tax rates, may add some bias to my 
analysis depending on market situations. Property tax burden per capita has been stable in 
New Hampshire from 1995-2009 (see figure 4.1). This indicates that property tax rates 
have been adjusted given the market situations, i.e. lower property tax rates in economic 
slowdowns and higher property tax rates in economic expansions. It is less likely that 
simulated property tax rates would capture such variations, which is a limitation o f my 
data. If actual property tax rates and CU program data were available for all the states, the 
analyses done in this chapter would be more accurate and could be extended for detailed 
analyses. This would open up an important extension to the work done in this chapter: 
research as to whether CU programs are crowding in or crowding out (Parker & 
Thurman, 2011) federal land conservation programs.
When considering the substitutability or complementarity o f the New Hampshire 
land conservation and CU programs, results suggest that an increase in CU land results in 
a reduction o f land enrolled in other conservation programs (model 5). In New 
Hampshire, withdrawal penalties collected from the CU program are partially or fully 
allocated to conservation funds. For example, in Concord, the allocation o f LUCT to
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conservation funds has ranged between 25%-100% during the study period. On the other 
hand, Durham and Dover have allocated 100% o f LUCT to the conservation funds since 
2002 and 2001 respectively (New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration, 
1995-2012). Therefore, it is clear that the success o f other land conservation effects does 
depend on the CU program.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Data Sources
Variable Data Sources
Land data, agricultural land 
values and net farm income:
U.S. Department o f Agriculture (USDA) -  
Economic Research Service (ERS), National 






http ://www.census, cio v/popest
Local Tax Collection Data
http ://www. censu s. gov/govs/index, html
Tax Foundation www.taxfoundation.org
Assessed value ratios of 
properties:
Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy
New Hampshire CU data The New Hampshire Department o f Revenue 
Administration (NHDRA)
Residential permit data U.S. Department o f Commerce
http://censtats.census.gov/bldg/bldgprmt.shtml?
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Table 4.2: Property Tax Burden to per Capita Income and Simulated Property Tax Rates




Ratio Property Tax Burdens Calculated Property Tax Rates
1982-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 1982-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010
Alabama 3.78 8.50 0.44 8.63 8.72 8.52 3.84 3.88 3.79
Alaska 12.44 4.80 2.59 5.69 5.29 5.49 14.74 13.71 14.23
Arizona 7.39 8.60 0.86 9.24 9.42 8.73 7.94 8.09 7.50
Arkansas 7.00 9.00 0.78 8.38 9.00 9.54 6.51 7.00 7.42
California 7.20 10.20 0.71 10.08 10.33 10.57 7.11 7.29 7.46
Colorado 6.52 8.60 0.76 9.24 9.22 8.62 7.00 6.99 6.53
Connecticut 14.33 10.80 1.33 9.85 11.27 11.24 13.07 14.95 14.91
Delaware 6.32 8.40 0.75 9.05 8.81 9.03 6.81 6.63 6.79
Florida 11.71 8.30 1.41 8.06 8.84 8.68 11.37 12.47 12.25
Georgia 8.55 9.10 0.94 9.13 9.43 9.18 8.57 8.86 8.63
Hawaii 3.08 9.50 0.32 9.53 10.13 9.75 3.09 . 3.28 3.16
Idaho 9.06 9.90 0.92 9.86 10.25 9.69 9.03 9.38 8.87
Illinois 16.07 9.10 1.77 9.66 9.67 9.60 17.06 17.08 16.95
Indiana 9.51 8.20 1.16 8.45 8.75 8.95 9.80 10.15 10.39
Iowa 12.87 9.10 1.41 10.03 10.05 9.20 14.18 14.21 13.01
Kansas 11.56 9.20 1.26 9.08 9.65 9.45 11.40 12.13 11.87
Kentucky 7.24 9.60 0.75 9.19 10.11 9.66 6.93 7.62 7.29
Louisiana 3.59 8.00 0.45 7.50 7.90 8.25 3.37 3.55 3.70
Maine 13.03 10.60 1.23 10.35 10.82 10.55 12.72 13.30 12.96
Maryland 11.21 10.10 1.11 10.26 10.44 10.26 11.39 11.59 11.39
Massachusetts 11.15 9.70 1.15 10.36 10.66 10.05 11.91 12.25 11.56
Michigan 12.36 9.40 1.31 10.03 9.75 9.55 13.18 12.82 12.55
Minnesota 11.47 9.90 1.16 10.60 10.55 10.12 12.28 12.22 11.72
Mississippi 6.18 8.70 0.71 8.54 8.84 8.65 6.06 6.28 6.14




Ratio Property Tax Burdens Calculated Property Tax Rates
1982-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 1982-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010
Missouri 9.22 8.90 1.04 8.79 9.31 9.09 9.10 9.64 9.42
Montana 10.88 8.50 1.28 8.90 9.01 8.59 11.39 11.53 11.00
Nebraska 16.44 9.20 1.79 9.53 9.77 9.73 17.02 17.46 17.38
Nevada 7.92 6.90 1.15 7.36 7.41 7.50 8.45 8.51 8.61
New Hampshire 19.90 7.30 2.73 7.65 8.47 7.65 20.85 23.09 20.84
New Jersey 20.48 10.70 1.91 11.00 11.54 11.46 21.05 22.09 21.94
New Mexico 6.14 9.50 0.65 8.64 9.75 8.83 5.58 6.30 5.71
New York 18.34 11.60 1.58 12.14 12.24 12.03 19.19 19.35 19.02
North Carolina 7.63 9.20 0.83 9.33 9.70 9.70 7.73 8.04 8.04
North Dakota 16.87 9.00 1.87 9.20 9.47 8.85 17.24 17.75 16.60
Ohio 12.05 9.90 1.22 9.50 9.95 10.07 11.56 12.11 12.26
Oklahoma 7.98 9.10 0.88 8.54 9.33 8.91 7.49 8.18 7.81
Oregon 10.45 9.70 1.08 10.76 10.51 17.48 11.59 11.32 18.83
Pennsylvania 15.13 9.50 1.59 9.83 10.03 10.07 15.65 15.97 16.04
Rhode Island 16.72 10.80 1.55 10.59 11.13 10.83 16.39 17.23 16.76
South Carolina 5.49 8.60 0.64 9.00 8.92 8.59 5.75 5.69 5.48
South Dakota 16.10 6.90 2.33 8.00 7.51 7.21 18.67 17.52 16.82
Tennessee 7.63 6.90 1.11 7.46 7.50 7.39 8.25 8.29 8.17
Texas 16.98 7.10 2.39 7.41 7.97 7.55 17.73 19.06 18.07
Utah 6.37 9.90 0.64 10.04 10.13 9.84 6.46 6.52 6.33
Vermont 17.75 9.70 1.83 10.21 10.49 10.16 18.69 19.20 18.60
Virginia 8.91 9.40 0.95 9.29 9.52 9.36 8.80 9.02 8.88
Washington 10.24 8.50 1.20 9.03 9.46 9.08 10.87 11.40 10.94
West Virginia 5.34 9.20 0.58 9.54 9.20 9.37 5.54 5.34 5.44
Wisconsin 18.51 11.10 1.67 11.81 11.59 10.79 19.70 19.33 17.99
Wyoming 5.92 6.30 0.94 6.94 6.34 6.77 6.52 5.96 6.36
Table 4.3: Current Use Assessment - Based on Capitalization Rate or Some Fraction of Fair Market Value













Assess Val: 100% 
PropTaxRate~7 
CAP Rate~2-8
1987 1553.6 1553.6 90.0 106.4 106.4 194.2
1989 1742.0 1742.0 92.9 117.6 328.6 217.8
1991 2077.0 2077.0 31.0 148.8 611.7 259.6
1993 2213.0 2213.0 57.9 159.7 929.0 276.6
1995 2220.0 2220.0 20.5 161.5 1249.1 277.5
1997 2500.0 2500.0 26.6 178.1 1601.5 312.5
1999 2800.0 2800.0 41.4 194.7 1981.8 350.0
2001 3200.0 3200.0 33.8 234.7 2429.8 400.0
2003 3600.0 3600.0 58.0 255.0 2926.7 450.0
2005 5050.0 5050.0 89.1 360.7 3557.9 631.3
2007 5960.0 5960.0 129.3 444.5 4393.9 745.0
Georgia
Assess Val: 30% 
PropTaxRate~8 
CAP Rate~l. 5-5.0
1987 888.8 266.6 20.8 21.0 21.0 105.1
1989 1030.0 309.0 34.4 24.0 66.6 96.0
1991 1095.0 328.5 34.3 26.3 119.7 78.8
1993 1131.0 339.3 40.7 27.2 170.6 54.4
1995 1260.0 378.0 33.5 30.7 228.0 30.7
1997 1430.0 429.0 36.9 33.9 294.7 0.0
1999 1630.0 489.0 57.3 36.9 366.6 0.0
2001 1900.0 570.0 75.4 42.8 449.0 0.0
2003 2200.0 660.0 86.9 48.5 544.8 0.0
2005 3140.0 942.0 126.2 69.8 665.9 0.0
2007 4350.0 1305.0 152.6 100.7 857.7 0.0
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics -  1987




CU Value Dollars per acre 39.67 86.30 0.18 456.65
Property Tax Savings Dollars per acre 99.93 138.27 0.95 655.96
Land Variables
Agriculture Land Value Dollars per acre 1040.7 874.22 156.00 3729.00
Agriculture Land Value Dollars per acre rl21,99 275.80 -583.91 625.88
Crop land Percentage of total land 24.88 20.55 1.21 78.12
Forest Land Percentage of total land 38.34 23.42 1.04 87.90
Rural Transportation 
Land15
Percentage of total land 1.56 0.69 0.45 2.99
Urban Land16 Percentage of total land 5.70 7.21 0.15 29.53
Federal Land Percentage of total land 14.24 20.42 0.42 84.48
Developed Land Percentage of total land 6.64 6.49 0.39 2-7.37
Rural Land Percentage of total land 74.88 18.38 14.52 95.78
Rise in Developed 
Land
Percentage change in 
developed land




Index 2.39 3.15 0.16 13.24
Population Change 
(1982-1987)
Per 1000 38.47 51.81 -58.13 189.37
Net Farm Income (NFI) Dollars per acre 77.79 104.78 1.37 619.99
Capitalization Rate Rate per 100 4.80 2.70 0.80 10.30
Property Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue 1.73 3.46 0.00 15.77
Sales Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue 50.94 15.18 13.52 84.53
Income Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue 34.00 16.93 0.00 71.50
15 Rural transportation: Highways, roads, and railroad rights-of way, plus airport facilities outside an urban 
area
16 Urban area: Densely populated areas with at least 50,000 people (“urbanized areas”) and densely 
populated areas with 2,500 to 50,000 people (“urban clusters”)
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics -  2007'




CU Value Dollars per acre 111.00 237.37 -0.78 1411.74
Property Tax Savings Dollars per acre 383.26 606.36 2.97 2872.47
Land Variables
Agriculture Land Value Dollars per acre 3865.22 3832.8 460.00 16400.0
Agriculture Land Value Dollars per acre 698.36 312.30 294.12 1891.89
Crop land Percentage of total land 21.19 19.17 1.04 74.76
Forest Land Percentage of total land 38.50 22.82 1.58 87.86
Rural Transportation 
Land
Percentage of total land
1.51 0.57 0.51 2.91
Urban Land Percentage of total land 7.05 10.36 0.18 38.26
Federal Land Percentage of total land 14.34 20.43 0.43 84.60
Developed Land Percentage of total land 9.39 8.68 0.82 35.46
Rural Land Percentage of total land 71.97 18.42 13.96 95.39
Rise in Developed 
Land
Percentage change in 









49.32 44.00 -20.14 185.36
Net Farm Income (NFI) Dollars per acre 127.40 124.49 -0.65 531.22
Capitalization Rate Rate per 100 3.21 2.47 0.32 12.35
Property Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue 2.75 6.16 0.00 34.68
Sales Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue 46.67 15.91 10.11 81.30
Income Tax Revenue Percentage of tax revenue 38.94 18.33 0.00 77.51
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Table 4.1: Total Residential Permits Issued at County Level in New Hampshire 1999 - 2011
Year Belknap Carroll Cheshire Coos Grafton Hillsborough Merrimack Rockingham Strafford Sullivan
1999 338 333 271 93 263 1532 631 1690 448 117
2000 437 407 262 109 327 1565 669 1570 562 202
2001 409 496 235 81 390 1475 817 1416 487 147
2002 610 619 319 116 464 1605 947 1321 540 221
2003 598 622 359 110 515 1521 851 1146 581 265
2004 499 703 303 156 584 1570 916 1304 674 287
2005 557 563 337 144 482 1518 814 1133 626 244
2006 388 383 269 132 460 1085 554 790 456 210
2007 359 319 188 87 355 697 424 741 411 159
2008 210 223 124 54 237 404 249 473 214 108
2009 143 129 83 37 144 326 162 379 182 73
2010 150 138 88 44 159 367 176 481 208 68
2011 140 119 67 32 121 334 162 438 181 53
Table 4.7: State Comparison of Current Use Penalties on Land Development






Penalty Rise (Dummy) -0.546
(0.516)
Property Tax Savings ($/Acre) -0.007*** -0.007**
(0 .000) (0.002)
Internal Rate of Return (D=l if IRR< 0) 0.635 -0.110
(0.423) (0.933)
Enrollment (Dummy, l=Automatic) 1.110 0.420
(0.300) (0.810)
Severity of Penalty (Categories) 0.009 -0.319
(0.968) (0.430)
Land Variables
% Federal Land (Compared to Total -0.046 -0.045
Land) (0.191) (0.317)
% Developed Land (Lag) 0.845*** 0.728***
(0 .000) (0.000)
% Land: Rural Transportation 0.712 0.826
(0.483) (0.571)
Socio-Economic and other Land Conservation Program Variables
Pop. Change (per 1,000) 0.021* 0.016
(0.017) (0.200)
Farm Dependency Index -0.185 -0.207
(0.353) (0.637)
Change in AGLV ($/Acre) -0.001 -0.001
(0.496) (0.702)
CRP (Dummy) -0.680 -0.270
(0.438) (0.838)
Conse. Easement (Dummy) 0.105 -1.282
(0.911) (0.379)
Income Tax Credit (Dummy) 0.108 1.516
(0.915) (0.363)




R-Squared -  overall, between, within 0.639, 0.812, 0.545 0.579, 0.757, 0.085
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Full Value Tax Rate ($/1000 Value) -887.396***
(0.000)
CU Tax Savings per Acre ($/Acre) -0.006***
(0.000)
Socio-Economic Variables
Average Land Value ($) 1.973
(0.399)
Distance to Boston < 50 miles (D : Yes= 1) 22.478***
(0.000)
Distance to Manchester < 50 miles (D : Yes=l) 19.715***
(0.000)
Population Change (per 1000) 80.256***
(0:000)




R-Squared -  overall, between, within 0.069, 0.014, 0.336
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Figure 4.2: Severity of Current Use Withdrawal Penalties from 1987-2007
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A p p e n d ix
A .l Theoretical Background of Empirical Models Used
This section describes the theoretical background of duration analysis (Danacica & 
Babucea, 2010; Kiefer, 1988; Klein & Moeschberger, 2005), competing risk regressions 
and random-effect multinomial logit models used in chapter 3.
A.1.1 Duration Analysis
Duration analysis (also known as event history analysis, hazard analysis or 
survival analysis) has been used in different fields o f study to determine the time periods 
during which an event is most likely to occur, as well as why the event happened at 
different periods o f time. In logistic regression, the overall probability o f an event is 
considered without regard to the timing o f the event. Duration analysis allows for the 
inclusion of the longitudinal progression o f the probability o f  an event occurrence, 
considering the timing of the event.
Due to the uncertainty about whether an event could happen before or after the 
study period, duration analyses are preferred over simple regression or logistic regression 
(Allison, 1984). Uncertainties regarding the occurrence o f an event are known as 
censoring, in which individuals or jurisdictions o f interest have not experienced the event 
during a period of study or may have experienced the event before the study period. If the
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end-time is observed beyond the time period, such observations are considered to be 
right-censored (see figure A .l) and the observations are considered left-censored if the 
event is observed before the study period (Fox & Andersen, 2005; Kiefer, 1988; Klein & 
Moeschberger, 2005). Such censoring are due to the lack o f control by the researcher 
over when the event happened or may happen in the future. Right-censored observations 
are common. Excluding observations o f  the event from before the study period, known as 
left truncated, or excluding observations o f the event from after the period o f study, 
known as right truncated, would lead to serious sample size reductions. Duration analysis 
directly deals with such observations, which is advantageous for most o f the researchers.
The events that happen could be categorized as discrete versus continuous time 
events, repeated or non-repeated events and single versus multiple kinds o f events. In 
discrete time events, observations will be grouped or banded into discrete intervals of 
time, such as for months or years (Allison, 1984; Themeau & Grambsch, 2000). 
However, the event may happen in continuous time. Unavailability or not reporting of 
data in continuous time could be the reason for considering continuous time data with 
discrete events. Considering continuous time data with discrete time analysis is known as 
interval censoring (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). In multiple kinds o f  events, the 
same individual or the same observations have the possibility o f  experiencing one event 
out of multiple events that are studied.
In order to consider various types o f  data, numerous event history methodologies 
have been developed in the past. Basic duration model is described in the following 
section, which expands to describe briefly the Cox proportional hazard model and the 
survivor function.
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In duration analysis, T, a random variable that represents the time of the event, 
has a cumulative distribution function represented as P(t) = Pr(T  < t) , where t is the 
duration o f the study. The survivor function, S(t), is the probability that an event has not " 
occurred during the period o f study t, and is represented by S(t) = PrfT > 0  = 1 -  P ( t) . 
The probability that an event occurred before the time o f study is known as cumulative 
density function and denoted as .F(f) = PtfT < f) =  1 — S(t) . Modeling o f duration 
(survival) data usually employs a hazard function (Kiefer, 1988) or log hazard function. 
The hazard function, h(t) in general, assesses the risk o f an event happening during time t 
and represented as h(t)=Pr(T= t \T > t ) .
The Cox Proportional Hazards Model: In the duration (survival) analysis, the 
relationship o f survival distribution to its covariates17 (independent variables o f the 
model) is usually examined. I f  the covariates x(t) are assumed to be constant over time, 
the model is referred to as the Cox Proportional Hazard model. The relationship of 
survival distribution to its covariates is mostly specified as \oghj(t) = a (t) + /3kxik,
where a(t) = \ogh0(t) is the baseline hazard function with the event o f interest 
happening when all the covariates are zero (Allison, 1984; Therneau & Grambsch, 2000). 
Equivalently, the Cox Hazard model can be represented as ht(t) = a(t)exp(/3kxi k).
17 In event history analysis* independent variables are referred to as covariates.
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The Survivor Function for the Cox Model: The relative risk or hazard rate (HR) of 
an event for a binary covariate can be written as:
HR =  P) = e x p q ^  - x 0) f i )  = exp(P)
K(t)exp{xo P)
Using the above hazard formula, the survivor function for the Cox model can be written 
as S(t) = exp(-H (l)). By writing H (t) in term o f  S (t) :
S(t) = e;*p[~J h{u).du]
= exp[—exp(xt K  (u).du]
e x p f x , ^ )
= exp[-joh0(u).du]
=[s0( t )r^
A.1.2 Random Effect Multinomial Logit Regression
In many studies, data occur in repeated unordered categorical form. Such repeated 
measurements may add some correlated errors to the model setting. This section will 
briefly discuss multinomial logit models, which are used in cross-sectional and 
longitudinal settings in the presence o f unordered categorical dependent variables.
In a cross sectional setting an indirect utility function can be written as 
Vip = a j + PjXu + s tJ, where j  represents a unit o f observation (hereafter individual) and
xn is a set o f individual characteristics. et) is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (Hartzel, Agresti, & Caffo, 2001; Livote, Ross, & Penrod, 2010). 
The probability o f an individual’s choice is:
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exp (aj+Xupj )
,7  =  1 ,2 ,3  J.
In the case o f such longitudinal settings, individual heterogeneity present in an 
individual is likely to give some correlated errors (Long & Freese, 2006; Rabe-Hesketh, 
Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004). Including such correlated errors, the above indirect utility 
function can be written as Vi]l= a J +uiJ+ f}jXu +ev, where utj represents individual
heterogeneity. In this random multinomial setting, the probability o f choosing an 
unordered multinomial choice can be written as:
A.1.3 Competing Risk Regressions
As discussed in section 3.2.2, standard duration analysis focuses on event-time 
data that only has a single type o f event or failure. In many analyses, treating all the 
events possible to one outcome would be convenient. However, such aggregation of 
information will lead to loss o f information that is relevant for the analyses. Therefore, 
distinguishing different possible events or outcomes is important for many researchers. 
Random effect multinomial logit (RMNL) is one alternative that researchers use to 
evaluate multinomial dependent variables o f interest. Competing risks models are another 
alternative (Dignam, Zhang, & Kocherginsky, 2012; Sun & Tiwari, 1995; Themeau & 
Grambsch, 2000). Choosing to use competing risk models over RMNL regression 
depends on the availability o f  data and also the type o f data available for analyses.
_ exp (oCj+u^+x.Pj). 
iji j
X e*p(«* +«,* + x M
,7 = 1,2,3 J.
k=1
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RMNL considers the effect of different independent variables when choosing one 
alternative over another, without tracking the time o f the event. Competing risk models, 
on the other hand, have the capability to track the time o f the event as well as predict the 
effect o f covariates on different alternatives.
Competing risk model is a model used for multiple durations that start at the same 
time, where the individual or jurisdiction is observed until one o f  the events being 
analyzed is occurred. However, we should note that some o f the units in the analysis may 
have also experienced the event before the period o f analysis, which we consider as left- 
censored observations in duration analysis.
One o f the common approaches to modeling competing risk models is known as 
cause-specific or type specific hazard function. In estimating cause-specific competing 
risk hazard models, the model proposed by Cox in 1972 is widely used (Sun & Tiwari, 
1995). In cause-specific models, if the total number o f possible events equals J, then the 
probability o f an event j  happening during the time period t and t + At can be written as 
P-(t,t + A t). Considering the above probability, the cause-specific hazard rate is written 
as follows (Allison, 1984; Steele et al., 2004):
h. (t) = lim Pr, (I, t  + At) / At
where, each event type has its own hazard function and the overall hazard function h(t) 
is the summation of all the competing risk functions. The hazard that no event o f any type
m
occurs at time t can be given as: h0(t) = \ - ' ^ h j {f).With covariates (jc#), the above
J = l
hazard rate can also be expressed as:
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¥r(t < T  < t + &t\T >t,Xi) 
h ( t , x )  = l i m--------------------- '-----------
J ‘ A/->0 A t
The overall hazard rate is represented by h(t) = y ,  /i,.(Q.
Based on the above, the probability o f the occurrence o f an event j  can be given in the 
following cumulative incidence function (CIF):
/
I  j  (t) = J hj (u)du = Pr(T < t and J  = j )
0
Competing risks can be modeled simultaneously using a multinomial logit, or 
used to consider competing risks separately, treating all other events as censored (Sun & 
Tiwari, 1995). In estimating competing risk models, two approaches are widely used 
(Dignam et al., 2012). The approaches are using Cox Proportional Hazards model to 
obtain cause-specific hazards, and using the Fine and Gray model to obtain cumulative 
incidence rates.
In the Fine and Gray model, cumulative incidence ftinction (CIF) is considered to 
be a survival function, and underlying hazard is calculated (Fine & Gray, 1999; Steele et 
al., 2004). The hazards o f  the Fine and Gray model are referred to as sub-hazard and
d  hXt)
denoted as hj (t, x ) , where hj (/, x) = — -  log(l -  / y (r, x)) -
dt J l - / , ( 0
= ^o(O exp(x,^)
hjo is the baseline sub-hazard for type j  events, and exp(x,/^) is the relative risk 
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